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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States legal system relies on the ability of jurors to impartially 
consider complex psychological testimony despite research indicating that they are 
unable to distinguish between scientifically rigorous evidence and evidence based on 
less objective methods. The purpose of this study was to better understand how different 
forms of expert testimony and juror information processing mode influence decision 
making in a capital case. 
Mock jurors completed a measure identifying their preferences for processing 
information in a rational, logical manner (Rationality) and an affect-driven, emotional 
manner (Experientiality). Following this, participants were instructed to alter their 
cognitive processing through written instructions given by the judge. Specifically, 
participants were primed to employ a rational, analytical mindset or rely on their gut-
instincts and intuition. Participants were then presented with a capital murder case 
vignette and expert testimony (clinical opinion or actuarial) concerning defendant 
likelihood for future violence (high or low) and psychopathy diagnosis (psychopath or 
no diagnosis). Finally, a subsample of participants participated in a deliberations 
activity.  
Results suggest testimony type did not have a significant influence on juror 
ratings of future dangerousness or ultimate verdict. However, participants who reviewed 
clinical opinion testimony asserting the defendant was a psychopath perceived the 
defendant to be more psychopathic than participants who heard actuarial testimony 
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making the same assertions. This effect was driven specifically by participants’ higher 
ratings of the defendant’s affective and interpersonal psychopathy traits. In addition, 
participation in the deliberations activity resulted in significant changes in perceptions of 
psychopathy. Specifically, participants who heard clinical opinion testimony asserting 
that the defendant was a psychopath perceived the defendant as significantly more 
psychopathic following the deliberations activity compared to their pre-deliberations 
ratings.  
Future research examining the relationship between psychopathy evidence and 
legal decision making should consider the relationship between individual information 
processing and perception of psychopathic traits. Further, these data support the 
importance of including deliberations in mock jury research. Finally, these data lend 
further support to the effectiveness of clinical opinion testimony, particularly in regards 
to its influence on juror perceptions of defendant psychopathic traits. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The structure of the American legal system places enormous weight on the 
ability of jury members to impartially consider complex scientific evidence. To assist 
jury members in this regard, courts have allowed expert testimony when it is determined 
that the testimony can assist the jury to understand evidence or determine an important 
fact (Fed. R. Evd. 702). Medical doctors have been acting in this regard for centuries but 
it was not until the 1962 United States Supreme Court (USSC) ruling in Jenkins v. U.S. 
that psychologists could be utilized as expert witnesses if their unique knowledge could 
assist the trier of fact. Since this time psychologists have consistently offered their expert 
knowledge in a variety of capacities (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 2007). A 
significant focus of this testimony in both civil and criminal contexts for psychiatrists 
and psychologists has been on the prediction of future violent behavior. For example, 
mental health professionals have opined about future dangerousness in cases concerning 
involuntary civil commitment (O’Connor v. Donaldson, 1975), the detention of a sexual 
offender after completion of court imposed sentences (Kansas v. Hendricks, 1997), and 
pretrial detention of defendants (United States v. Salerno, 1987). Similarly, the USSC 
majority opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) asserted it is within the scope of expertise 
for an expert mental health professional to opine about a capital defendant’s likelihood 
for committing future violent acts. This type of expert testimony may be particularly 
useful in jurisdictions that require jurors to weigh this factor when contemplating 
sentencing decisions in capital cases (Jurek v. Texas, 1976).  
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 Although mental health expert testimony is supposedly held to the same 
scientifically rigorous standards as other forms of expert testimony (Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 1999), many psycholegal scholars have questioned whether such evidence 
should be admitted at trial (Shuman & Sales, 1998). For example, Grove and Meehl 
(1996) argued that: 
All policymakers should know that a practitioner who claims not to need any 
statistical or experimental studies but relies solely on clinical experience as 
adequate justification, by that very claim is shown to be a  nonscientifically 
minded person whose professional judgments are not to be trusted. (p. 320).  
Similarly, Morse (1978) long ago argued that clinical opinion testimony, as opposed to 
testimony based on scientifically sound methodology, is outside the scope of a 
clinician’s responsibilities, ethically questionable, and also admitted into evidence far 
too often. In contrast, Kwartner and Boccaccini (2008) opine that most experienced-
based methods have at least some empirical support, but acknowledge that it is at the 
discretion of experts whether to emphasize the clinical or empirical basis in their 
testimony.  
Inherent in the Barefoot ruling was the notion that lay jurors are able to 
distinguish scientifically rigorous testimony from testimony based on less objective 
means. Despite this assumption, research has not supported this belief (Krauss, 
Lieberman, & Olson, 2004; Krauss & Sales, 2001). The recent Texas Supreme Court 
ruling in Coble v. State (2010) suggests that criminal courts are beginning to recognize 
that clinical opinion expert testimony is highly fallible and potentially inadmissible in 
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relation to predictions of ‘future dangerousness,’ but federal evidentiary standards 
established under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) allow each judge 
significant discretion when determining the admissibility of such evidence. As such, the 
admissibility of expert testimony may vary between courtrooms and rely heavily on the 
knowledge, experience, and opinion of each presiding judge. Meaning, testimony based 
on the expert’s clinical opinion may be rejected by one judge as inadmissible but 
allowed by another judge as meeting Daubert evidentiary standards. It is necessary to 
understand how legal decision makers digest this information and what impact mental 
health testimony has on court decisions.  
 In addition to testimony concerning future dangerousness, the construct of 
psychopathy is being introduced by mental health professionals into the courtroom with 
increasing frequency to inform legal decision makers in a variety of contexts (Lally, 
2003; Lloyd, Clark, & Forth, 2012; Viljoen, McLachlan, & Vincent, 2010), including 
sexually violent predator trials, parole hearing, and death penalty cases (DeMatteo & 
Edens, 2006; DeMatteo et al., 2013; Walsh & Walsh, 2006). Research has demonstrated 
that psychopathy, as measured by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 2003), is 
modestly to moderately associated with specific outcome variables (e.g., criminal 
recidivism) considered important by legal decision makers (Gendreau, Goggin, & Smith, 
2002; Guy, Edens, Anthony, & Douglas, 2005, Singh, Desmarais, & Van Dorn, 2013; 
Singh, Grann & Fazel, 2011; Yang, Wong & Coid, 2010).  
Given that psychopathy evidence is often introduced as informing the mental 
health expert’s opinions concerning future dangerousness (DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; 
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DeMatteo et al., 2013) it is important to understand what impact this type of evidence 
has on decision makers. A number of studies have examined the potentially prejudicial 
nature of the psychopathy construct on decisions rendered by judges (Murrie, 
Boccaccini, McCoy, & Cornell, 2007), juvenile parole officers (Murrie, Cornell, & 
McCoy, 2005), clinicians (Rockett, Murrie, & Boccaccini, 2007), and mock jurors (Cox, 
DeMatteo, & Foster, 2010; Cox, Edens, Clark, Smith & Magyar, 2013; Edens, Deforges, 
Fernandez, & Palac, 2004). However, to date, no research has examined how 
psychopathy evidence reported in the context of clinical and/or actuarial testimony is 
digested by legal decision makers.   
 The aim of the present study was to examine how different forms of expert 
testimony, clinical opinion and actuarial, concerning psychopathy and future 
dangerousness affect juror decision making in a capital case. For the purposes of this 
research, clinical opinion testimony was defined as testimony based on a clinician’s own 
experiences and idiosyncratic beliefs absent an empirically supported assessment 
measure (Shuman & Sales, 1998). In contrast, actuarial testimony is defined as 
testimony based on a defendant’s obtained scores on a statistically derived formula 
(Meehl, 1954). The effect of clinical opinion and actuarial testimony on juror verdict, 
ratings of defendant dangerousness, level of psychopathy, psychopathic traits, and were 
examined.  
 A second aim of this study was to investigate the method through which jurors 
process information and examine how this interacts with expert testimony to impact 
decision making. Specifically, this study attempted to understand the differential effects 
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of experiential and rational processing. Experiential processing is defined as processing 
information in a manner than is emotional, unreflective and affect driven (Epstein, 
1994). In contrast, rational processing is evaluative and relatively affect-free. The effect 
of experiential and rational processing on juror verdict, ratings of defendant 
dangerousness, level of psychopathy, and psychopathic traits was examined. 
To investigate these questions, undergraduate Psychology students and jury-
eligible community members were recruited and given a short vignette about a capital 
trial based loosely on Coble v. Texas (2010
1
). In Coble, the defendant was convicted of 
capital murder and sentenced to death after the court heard expert testimony asserting the 
defendant was likely to be a continuing threat to society. Using a 2 x 2 design, this 
project instructed jurors to engage in a specific information processing mode (Rational 
or Experiential) and then exposed jurors to different forms of prosecution and defense 
expert testimony (clinical opinion or actuarial) regarding the defendant’s level of future 
dangerousness. Testimony-type was counterbalanced such that prosecution clinical 
opinion testimony was always contradicted by subsequent actuarial testimony by a 
defense witness and prosecution actuarial testimony was always contradicted by 
subsequent clinical opinion testimony by a defense witness. Jurors then provided 
sentencing recommendations for the defendant and rendered ratings concerning their 
perceptions of the defendant’s likelihood of future violence and the extent to which he 
exhibited psychopathic traits.  
                                               
1Coble v. Texas was originally heard by a Texas criminal court in 1990. However, for the purposes of this 
study information concerning the case was taken directly from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
decision rendered and published in 2010.  
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Before describing the methodology of this study and obtained results, the 
relevant psychological literature and case law will be discussed. Specifically, reviews 
will be provided regarding the purpose and admissibility of mental health expert 
testimony, research concerning the appropriateness of expert testimony concerning 
future dangerousness, different forms of expert testimony, and the effect of expert 
testimony on juror decision making. In addition, the construct of psychopathy will be 
explored, including its historical and theoretical contexts, application to the legal system, 
and influence on juror decision making. Finally, Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory will 
be reviewed, including its application to juror decision making.  
1.1 Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 To understand the context through which mental health professionals may be 
called by the court to provide expert opinions concerning future dangerousness, it is 
necessary to first understand the legal constructs of aggravating and mitigating factors in 
capital murder trials. In response to Furman v. Georgia (1972), in which the USSC ruled 
that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it violated the United States 
Constitutional 8
th
 Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, states 
began to establish more structure in regards to factors that juries could consider when 
determining the appropriateness of a capital sentence (Cunningham, 2006). This 
structure included a clearer outline of aggravating and mitigating factors, or evidence 
that juries must consider during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. These factors 
were meant to eliminate the arbitrariness with which the death penalty previously had 
been imposed and reduce the number of defendants eligible for this sentence. Mitigating 
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factors include any elements presented by the defense in an attempt to convince the jury 
to impose a lesser sentence. There are no restrictions on what type of evidence this may 
entail and can include such factors as defendant mental disorder, good behavior while 
incarcerated, and childhood abuse.  
 Aggravating factors, on the other hand, are evidence presented by the prosecution 
to convince the jury that a death sentence is appropriate. This evidence is limited in 
scope and can include the nature of the crime, circumstances of the crime scene, and the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time of the offense. In Texas, as well as a handful of 
other jurisdictions, jurors must consider the likelihood that the defendant will pose a 
continuing threat to society if not given a death sentence (Jurek v. Texas, 1976). In fact, 
Morier (1987) determined that future dangerousness is the one factor that may be most 
important when a jury is contemplating a capital sentence; when jurors opt for a sentence 
of life in prison, they cite their inability to agree on the potential risk to society as the 
main issue of contention among jurors. Considering the USSC has upheld the 
admissibility of future dangerousness testimony by psychological expert witnesses, and 
certain states require jurors to consider this aggravating factor when determining a 
capital offender’s sentence, the ability of mental health experts to reliability and validly 
measure this outcome is of particular importance.  
1.2 Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
 In Jenkins v. U.S. (1962) the USSC ruled psychologists could testify concerning 
a defendant’s mental illness if their knowledge could assist the trier of fact. Since this 
ruling the legal and ethical implications of mental health testimony have remained a 
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heated topic among psycholegal scholars. Melton et al. (2007) asserted that 
psychological expert testimony should be allowed if the knowledge exhibited by the 
psychologists is specialized and can assist in answering the ultimate legal question. 
Taking a more conservative stance, Morse (1978) argued that psychologists should only 
be permitted to testify concerning their observations of a defendant’s behavior, as 
opposed to interpreting the meaning of said behavior.  
The USSC has also directly addressed the question of testimony concerning 
defendant future dangerousness by mental health professionals. In the landmark ruling of 
Barefoot v. Estelle (1983), the USSC refused to overturn the death penalty sentence of 
Thomas Barefoot, a Texas man accused and convicted of murdering a police officer. 
During the sentencing phase of the trial, a psychiatrist testified that there was a “100% 
chance” the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society, despite never having 
interviewed Barefoot. During the appellate process, the American Psychiatric 
Association submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the defendant’s assertion that 
such testimony should be inadmissible because it does not meet federal evidentiary 
standards. The USSC disagreed and upheld the admissibility of such testimony, asserting 
that the nature of the adversarial system (i.e., the right of a defendant to introduce an 
expert of an opposing opinion) would allow for jurors to determine the accuracy of such 
testimony. This ruling, in effect, left the door open for the admission of this type of 
evidence, which continues to be provided in capital cases around the country, 
particularly Texas.  
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 Although Jenkins permitted expert testimony by psychologists and Barefoot 
permitted mental health professionals to testify concerning future dangerousness, both of 
these rulings must be considered in light of the more recent USSC ruling in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993). Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Harry 
Blackmun asserted that courts must individually consider scientific expert testimony and 
determine its methodological strength and applicability to the legal question at hand. In 
making this determination, the court must consider the testability of the expert’s 
assertion as well as the established error rate of the methodology being utilized. In 
effect, the ruling established each individual judge as a “gatekeeper” and charged him or 
her with reevaluating evidence that had previously been admitted under ostensibly less 
stringent standards. The USSC further substantiated this ruling in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael (1999) in which the majority opinion ruled the newly established Daubert 
standard applies to all categories of expert testimony.  
 In response to the USSC’s Daubert ruling, in 2000 the United States Congress 
amended Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 to state that scientific, technical, or 
specialized knowledge is only admissible in a court of law if it is based on sufficient 
scientific data, is the product of reliable methodology, and standardized methodology 
was applied for that specific case. Among other states, Texas accepted FRE 702 as well 
as adopted the Daubert standard for both civil and criminal hearings.
2
 
                                               
2In the state of Texas the Daubert standard is generally referred to as the “Kelly/Daubert” standard 
because of the Texas Supreme Court ruling in Kelly v. State (1992), which is consistent with the USSC 
Daubert decision.   
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1.3 Expert Testimony Concerning Future Dangerousness 
 Although the Daubert standard asserts that expert testimony must be based on 
scientifically sound methodology, the individual discretion with which judges can admit 
such testimony is problematic. Specifically, research indicates few judges actually 
consider Daubert criteria when making decisions concerning testimony admissibility. In 
addition, although Daubert established seemingly specific standards on which to 
measure expert testimony, studies have found individual courts are continuing to weigh 
expert credentials as more important than the general acceptance of methodology by the 
scientific community, peer review, or error rate of a particular methodology (see 
Kwartner & Boccaccini, 2008, for an overview).  
Furthermore, research has indicated the consideration of future dangerousness, at 
least in capital cases, will likely be erroneous. In a series of studies, Cunningham and 
colleagues investigated capital defendants and their institutional disciplinary infractions 
post-conviction. The results of one study indicated government-appointed clinicians 
were likely to overestimate an inmate’s likelihood of future violence, with less than 1% 
of inmates (who were identified during sentencing as being a continuing risk to society) 
committing a violent act that resulted in injury. Additionally, 28% of inmates never 
received a single disciplinary infraction, including any minor discrepancies, at six years 
post-sentencing (Cunningham, Reidy, & Sorensen, 2007).  
In a second study, Cunningham, Reidy, and Sorensen (2008) reviewed the prison 
records for 145 male federal capital offenders serving sentences of life in prison. 
Although these offenders were described by the prosecution as being a continuing threat 
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to society, reviews of their prison disciplinary records (at an average of 6.17 years post-
admission) indicate they were no more likely than their non-capital offending 
counterparts to commit a violent or nonviolent disciplinary infraction. Furthermore, 
when the prosecution asserted future dangerousness during the trial, data concerning 
subsequent institutional violence suggested their prediction was no better than chance.  
In a follow up study, Cunningham, Sorensen, and Reidy (2009) determined jury 
predictions about inmate dangerousness was not significantly predictive of actual 
institutional misconduct measured, on average, five years post-sentencing, even after 
controlling for initial jury verdict. In fact, in considering base rate of institutional 
violence, when jurors determined a capital defendant would be a future danger, their 
predictions were incorrect 97% of the time.  
Cunningham, Sorensen, Vigen, and Woods (2011) retrospectively reviewed 
disciplinary records of former death row inmates who later had their sentences 
commuted. Despite being labeled by juries as a continuing threat to society, prevalence 
rates of violent assaults were comparable to capital offenders sentenced to life in prison. 
The low base rates of violent behavior remained low even after former death row 
offenders entered the general prison population. Meaning, the absence of violent 
assaultive behavior could not be attributed to heightened security and restrictions found 
in death row settings. Instead, the numbers of assaultive incidences were comparable 
across settings and none of the reported assaults resulted in life-threatening injuries to 
the victims. Cunningham et al. (2011) conclude capital juries are consistently inaccurate 
in their ability to predict rare, violent, behavior which results in high false positive rates.   
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Finally, Edens, Buffington-Vollum, Keilen, Roskamp, and Anthony (2005) 
examined disciplinary records for 155 inmates sentenced to death in the state of Texas. 
Despite expert testimony to the contrary, none of the inmates committed another murder 
and only 5.2% of inmates committed an assaultive act resulting in an injury requiring 
more than first aid.  Taken together, these findings suggest that caution must be used 
when allowing clinicians to render opinions concerning the future dangerousness 
question in capital cases.  
1.4 Actuarial Versus Clinical Prediction in Violence Risk Assessment 
A number of social science studies have established that predictions of future 
violent behavior are more accurate when based on actuarial assessment of the individual 
as opposed to unstructured clinical opinion (Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1996a, 
1996b; Mossman, 1994).Clinical opinion assessment is defined as judgments and 
decision making that relies on a clinician’s personal experience, rather than on data 
derived from statistically reliable and valid research (Shuman & Sales, 1998). In 
contrast, actuarial assessment is decision making rendered from a statistically derived 
formula. In the actuarial method, human judgment is eliminated and conclusions are 
drawn solely from the prescribed relationship between empirical data and the behavior 
of interest (Meehl, 1954). Notably, the clinical opinion approach should not be equated 
with a clinical or treatment setting and the actuarial approach should not be equated to 
automated decision rules alone (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Instead, Dawes, Faust, 
and Meehl (1989) argue that virtually any data are quantifiable. The differentiation 
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between these two approaches, although frequently explored in social science literature, 
has not consistently been clear in the courtroom (Shuman & Sales, 1998).  
A recent Texas Supreme Court case, however, did distinguish between these two 
approaches to decision making. In the appellate decision of the capital case Coble v. 
State (2010), the Texas Supreme Court ruled that clinical opinion testimony concerning 
future dangerousness originally offered by the prosecution was not admissible because it 
failed to meet evidentiary standards established under Daubert.
3
 Inconsistent with the 
USSC ruling in Barefoot, the Texas Supreme Court, in essence, acknowledged that 
Coble jurors may have difficulty differentiating scientifically sound testimony from 
testimony based on clinical opinion. An investigation of this assertion is described 
below.   
Briefly, it should be noted that a third approach, commonly referred to as guided 
professional judgment, was developed because of concerns about the inflexibility of the 
actuarial approach and lack of empirical support for clinical opinion (Lieberman et al., 
2007). Guided professional judgment combines the flexibility of clinical opinion with 
the structure of actuarial instruments. A number of risk assessment instruments have 
been developed which utilize this approach (e.g., Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-
20, Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997; Sexual Violence Recidivism-Revised, Boer, 
Hart, Kropp, & Webster, 1997) and advocates argue these measures focus on empirically 
                                               
3 At first glance, this ruling appears to support the notion that courts are becoming aware of the fallibility 
of clinical judgment and are also willing to exclude this type of evidence for failing to meet minimum 
scientific requirements. However, in Coble the Texas Supreme Court went on to state that there was no 
proof that the fallible clinical opinion testimony significantly influenced jurors in their decision making, 
and therefore refused to overturn the original sentencing decision.  
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supported risk factors and allow the clinician to combine and weigh factors in whatever 
manner s/he believes is appropriate. Although some researchers have examined the 
effect of guided professional judgment on juror decision making (Krauss, Lieberman, 
Olson, 2004) this approach is not the focus of the current investigation. 
1.5 Future Dangerousness Testimony and Juror Decision Making 
 Considering the USSC ruling in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983), social scientists have 
attempted to better understand the impact of psychological expert testimony concerning 
future dangerousness on jury decision making. Inherent in the Barefoot ruling is the 
assumption that jurors are able to accurately distinguish more empirically based, 
scientific evidence from less reliable clinical opinion. A number of studies have 
investigated whether jurors are able to make this distinction. Krauss and Sales (2001) 
presented undergraduate mock jurors with information from a capital case including 
future dangerousness expert testimony that was constructed as either clinical opinion or 
actuarial in nature. In addition, participants received one of four different adversarial 
procedures: cross-examination, constructed as either ineffective or effective, and 
competing expert testimony, given as either clinical opinion or actuarial. In the 
‘ineffective’ condition the expert witness was cross-examined and the defense attorney 
attacked the credibility of the witness without attacking the content of the testimony. In 
the ‘effective’ cross-examination condition the defense attorney attacked the material 
and content of the expert witness’ testimony. In the ‘competing expert’ conditions a 
second expert was presented and countered the original expert’s testimony, using either 
clinical opinion or actuarial methods.  
 15 
 
 Participant decision making was measured pre- and post- exposure to expert 
testimony. Regardless of type (clinical opinion versus actuarial) participants rated the 
defendant as significantly more dangerous following exposure to this testimony. Clinical 
opinion testimony, however, had a greater impact than actuarial testimony. This 
preference for clinical opinion testimony remained even after the presentation of 
adversarial procedures. Importantly, mock jurors rated both types of testimony as 
equally scientific, suggesting an inability to identify the potential fallibility of clinical 
opinion testimony even when presented with adversarial evidence emphasizing its flaws. 
In addition, although mock jurors were more influenced by clinical opinion testimony, 
there was no difference in their ratings of testimony impact on their verdict, suggesting 
jurors might be unaware of the impact of expert testimony on their decision making 
processes.  
 In a follow up study, Krauss and Lee (2003) attempted to understand how 
deliberations might impact juror decision making. Researchers presented undergraduates 
with case information and expert testimony identical to those given by Krauss and Sales 
(2001). Participants rated the defendant’s likelihood of future dangerousness prior to and 
directly after engaging in fifteen minutes of unmonitored deliberations with a group of 
peers. Results mirrored those of Krauss and Sales (2001) in that jurors favored clinical 
opinion testimony and reported more confidence in their dangerousness ratings of the 
defendant. Interestingly, when jurors heard actuarial expert testimony their ratings of 
defendant dangerousness initially increased and subsequently returned to baseline after 
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engaging in deliberations. Finally, deliberations resulted in a decrease in juror ratings of 
expert effectiveness, regardless of type of testimony presented.  
 Taken together, these experimental studies support the hypothesis that juror 
decision making is strongly influenced by expert testimony concerning future 
dangerousness. Furthermore, these data seem to indicate jurors are more influenced by 
clinical opinion testimony, are unaware of the impact of this type of testimony, and are 
unable to recognize its potential fallibility.  
 As stated previously, juror consideration of defendant future dangerousness 
during capital sentencing is legally mandated in some jurisdictions. In part because of an 
effort to inform jurors of defendant future dangerousness, testimony concerning the 
construct of psychopathy has become increasingly popular in this context (DeMatteo & 
Edens, 2006; DeMatteo et al., 2013; Walsh & Walsh, 2006). Next we examine the 
theoretical foundations of the psychopathy construct, whether psychopathy is a relevant 
factor to consider when assessing future dangerousness, and the potential implications of 
the introduction of psychopathy testimony.   
1.6 Psychopathy 
 Due in part to Hervey Cleckley’s revolutionary book, The Mask of Sanity (1941), 
the construct of psychopathy has become increasingly popular in both research and 
clinical settings. According to Cleckley, psychopathy is defined by 16 traits: superficial 
charm and good intelligence; absence of delusions; absence of nervousness; 
unreliability; insincerity; lack of remorse; inadequately motivated antisocial behavior; 
failure to learn from experience; incapacity for love; general poverty in affective 
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relations; lack of insight; unresponsiveness in interpersonal relations; uninviting 
behavior with our without substance abuse; suicidal threats rarely acted on; impersonal 
and trivial sexual relations; and a failure to follow any life plan.  
 Although Cleckley’s original conceptualization referenced the presence of 
“inadequately motivated antisocial behavior,” he did not specify criminal behavior as a 
central component to the psychopathy construct.
4
 Currently, a debate exists among 
leading theorists and researchers concerning the essentiality of criminal conduct to the 
psychopathy construct. One side of the debate holds that antisociality, including juvenile 
delinquency, is a critical element of psychopathy (Hare & Neumann, 2005). Scholars 
with opposing views hold that criminal behavior is a correlate of the disorder but not 
necessarily requisite (Skeem & Cooke, 2010). Although current research supports the 
assertion that psychopathy can exist in the absence of criminal conduct (DeMatteo, 
Heilbrun, & Marczyk, 2005, 2006), the issue is far from resolved (Skeem & Cooke, 
2010).  
 For the purposes of the current investigation, it is important to acknowledge that, 
while criminality may or may not be a central component to the psychopathy construct, 
it is often associated with psychopathy both in the literature (Hare & Neumann, 2005; 
Vitacco, Neumann, & Jackson, 2005) and the legal system (Lally, 2003; Lloyd, Clark, & 
Forth, 2010). Further, if the criminal behavior was not present, there would be no legal 
proceedings in which to introduce the psychopathy construct. As such, psychopathy has 
                                               
4 Skeem and Cooke (2010) differentiate criminal behavior from antisocial behavior by defining criminal 
behavior as a violation of an established law while antisocial behavior is defined more broadly as a 
behavior that interrupts societal interests (i.e. noncriminal manipulative behavior). 
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been increasingly introduced into the courtroom to aid legal decision-makers in 
answering a variety of questions including informing future dangerousness opinions 
(DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; DeMatteo et al., 2013; Gagnon, Douglas, & DeMatteo, 
2007).   
1.7 The Psychopathy Checklist-Revised  
Originally developed as a method of operationalizing the assessment of 
psychopathy in a criminal population, the PCL was published in its original form in 
1980. Scored using a semi-structured interview and file review, the revised version of 
the measure includes 20 items loosely based on Cleckley’s original criteria (see Table 1 
for a complete list of PCL-R items). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
Table 1. 
 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised Items. 
Factor Item  Item Description 
Factor 1   
 Glib/Superficial 
charm 
Smooth talking, may create a positive first 
impression, too slick to be believable  
 Grandiose self-worth Self-assured or cocky; attitude remarkably 
different from like circumstances and 
accomplishments  
 Pathological lying Readiness and ease at lying, deception has 
intrinsic value 
 Conning/Manipulative Scams and schemes to defraud or manipulate 
others; criminal and non-criminal acts 
 Lack of remorse or 
guilt 
No concern for effects of behaviors on others; 
may admit to this or feign sorrow that is 
insincere 
 Shallow affect Superficial emotions; limited range and depth of 
emotions; may include dramatic, short-lived 
overreactions 
 Callous/Lack of 
empathy 
Absence of concern for others’ feelings or 
welfare 
 Failure to accept 
responsibility 
Rationalization, denial, or minimization of the 
consequences of one’s actions 
Factor 2   
 Need for 
stimulation/Proneness 
to boredom 
Chronic, extensive desire for stimulation and 
risk-taking; may refuse things that are dull or 
routine 
 Parasitic lifestyle Financial dependence on others even though 
capable of work 
 Poor behavioral 
controls 
Short-tempered, prone to outbursts; May be 
easily offended and frustrated 
 Early behavior 
problems 
Serious behavioral problems prior to the age of 
12 (may include theft, fire-setting, drug-use, 
truancy, etc.) that typically result in complaints 
from others  
 Impulsivity Behavior lacks in planning and is poorly 
thought-out 
 Lack of life goals  Inability or unwillingness to follow a reasonable 
life plan 
 Irresponsibility Habitually fails to live up to basic 
responsibility; No sense of obligation or loyalty 
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Table 1. Continued.  
Factor Item Item Description 
 Juvenile delinquency History of antisocial behavior prior to the age of 
18. Must include charges and convictions 
resulting from formal contact with the legal 
system  
 Revocation of 
conditional release 
Violated release (e.g., failure on parole) or 
escaped from a penal institution 
 Criminal versatility Adult criminal record involves a wide array of 
offense types 
Not 
appearing 
on either 
factor 
  
 Promiscuous sexual 
behavior 
Sexual relations are impersonal, trivial, or 
indiscriminate 
 Many short-term 
marital relationships 
Marriage includes a live-in relationship 
involving some overt or implied level of 
commitment 
 
 
 
Initial data indicated the appropriateness of a two-factor model of the PCL-R, 
with Factor 1 associated with affective/interpersonal dimensions and Factor 2 associated 
with antisocial behavior and lifestyle (Hare, 2003). However, other models such as the 
three-factor (Cooke & Michie, 2001) and four-factor (e.g. Vitacco, Rogers, Neumann, 
Harrison, & Vincent, 2005) model have also been examined. The three-factor model 
outlines interpersonal, affective, and lifestyle components of psychopathy, and omits 
criminality as a central component. In contrast, the four-factor model retains PCL-R 
items that specifically relate to criminal conduct. The debate concerning the 
appropriateness of each model relates to the debate concerning the essentiality of 
criminal conduct in the psychopathy construct referenced earlier.   
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 Considering the PCL-R is being used in real world cases to assist the trier of fact 
with increasing frequency, many scholars have investigated the appropriateness of 
utilizing the measure in this manner. Key elements to consider when determining the 
suitability of a measure for a specific purpose is both the reliability of the tool and its 
validity as it pertains to the specific question at hand. It is common for the PCL-R to be 
referred to as globally reliable and valid (Hare & Neumann, 2008). However, a large 
portion of the research on the PCL-R has only examined the measure in the research 
laboratory. When utilized in “real world” settings, the utility of the PCL-R is less 
promising. Specifically, recent data have indicated the PCL-R demonstrates less than 
adequate reliability between raters in adversarial settings (DeMatteo et al., 2013; Lloyd 
et al., 2010; Murrie, Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 2008; see also Edens, Magyar, & 
Cox, 2013, for a more thorough review). 
1.8 Psychopathy in Legal Settings 
During legal proceedings the psychopathy concept is most commonly introduced 
through the use of the PCL-R (Viljoen et al., 2010). Considering the frequency in which 
the measure is used to address defendant future dangerousness (Viljoen et al., 2010), the 
predictive validity of the measure in this context must be examined. A number of meta-
analyses have determined that the PCL-R may be predictive of recidivism after an 
offender is released from incarceration (Gendreau et al., 2002; Leistico, Salekin, 
DeCosta, & Rogers, 2008; Walters, 2003), with the factor assessing behavioral 
characteristics (Factor 2) driving a large portion of the modest to moderate effect sizes. 
However, there is mixed empirical evidence concerning the ability of the PCL-R to 
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predict institutional misconduct and violence, with most studies reporting non-
significant or modest correlations between PCL-R scores and institutional misconduct, 
particularly violent conduct in U.S. prisons (Edens et al., 2005; Edens et al., 2001; Guy 
et al., 2005; Walters, 2003). Given the central question in death penalty cases is ”will the 
defendant commit a dangerous act while serving a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole?” that the PCL-R is actually not able to predict this outcome is 
troubling. For this reason, many psycholegal scholars caution against the use of the 
measure for addressing this specific question (Bersoff, 2008; Cunningham, 2006; Edens, 
2001; Edens, Magyar, & Cox, 2013).   
1.9 Juror Decision Making and Psychopathy 
 Although the empirical support for introducing the PCL-R into capital cases is 
questionable at best (see Edens, 2001; Edens, Magyar, & Cox, 2013), the construct 
continues to be introduced during these proceedings (DeMatteo & Edens, 2006; 
DeMatteo et al., 2013; Edens & Cox, 2012; Walsh & Walsh, 2006). Because of this, 
scholars have attempted to investigate the effect of psychopathy testimony on juror 
decision making in this capacity. In a simulated capital case Edens, Deforges, 
Fernandez, and Palac (2004) presented mock jurors with a case vignette and varied the 
defendant’s clinical diagnosis by condition: presented as either psychotic, psychopathic, 
or no diagnosis. Although the participants overestimated the likelihood that the 
defendant would commit a future violent act in every condition, this effect was most 
prevalent when the defendant was diagnosed as a psychopath.  
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 In a follow-up study 231 undergraduate mock jurors read a capital case vignette 
as well as expert testimony concerning the defendant’s level of future dangerousness and 
psychiatric diagnosis (again given as either psychopathic, psychotic or no diagnosis). 
Consistent with Edens et al. (2004), across conditions participants grossly overestimate 
the likelihood that the defendant would be violent in the future. However, this 
overestimation was particularly prevalent in the psychopathy and psychosis conditions. 
Further, data suggest juror perceptions of a defendant’s level of psychopathy predicted 
their support for a death sentence. This effect was significant even when analyses were 
restricted to participants who had already determined the defendant was a “continuing 
threat to society” suggesting the introduction of psychopathy testimony to inform future 
dangerousness decisions could be considered prejudicial.  
 In another study researchers attempted to better understand the prejudicial effect 
of the psychopathy label on capital juror sentencing decisions. Cox, DeMatteo, and 
Foster (2010) varied the defendant’s likelihood for future violence, given by a 
psychological expert witness as either high or low, and the presence of a psychopathy 
label, either present or absent. The defendant’s estimated violence risk was more 
predictive of jurors’ final verdict; meaning, the defendant who was presented as a future 
risk of violent behavior was more likely to receive the death penalty, regardless of 
psychopathy label. Interestingly, when asked to rate the likelihood that the defendant 
would commit another violent crime if given a sentence of life in prison, the defendant 
who was presented as a high likelihood for future violence and not a psychopath was 
rated by participants as more likely to be violent than the defendant who was presented 
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as a high likelihood for future violence and a psychopath (although this finding only 
approached significance). The authors concluded that, contrary to previous findings, the 
label “psychopath” might have worked in a mitigating manner in that jurors used the 
diagnosis to explain the defendant’s bad behavior.  
In addition to studies focusing on adult offenders, scholars have also investigated 
how psychopathy testimony influences juror decision making with juvenile offenders. 
Boccaccini, Murrie, Clark, and Cornell (2008) presented 891 jury-pool members with a 
vignette of a juvenile offender on trial and manipulated key variables of interest 
including antisocial behavior, psychopathic personality traits, and mental health 
diagnosis. Data suggest diagnostic label was not as influential as psychopathic traits and 
antisocial behavior, however, jurors who were told the defendant “is a psychopath” rated 
him as more likely to be violent and deserving of a harsher punishment than the 
defendant who simply “met criteria for psychopathy.” 
In addition to studies examining the effect of psychopathy on juror decision 
making, a number of studies have investigated how psychopathy testimony influences 
other players in the legal system including juvenile judges (Murrie et al., 2007), 
probation officers (Murrie et al., 2005), and clinicians (Rockett et al., 2007). Globally, 
research has indicated psychopathy testimony may influence perceptions of recidivism 
risk (Murrie et al., 2007; Murrie et al., 2005; Rockett et al., 2007), treatment amenability 
(Vidal & Skeem, 2007) and the need for harsher punishments (Jones & Cauffman, 
2008).   
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Taking a different approach, Edens, Davis, Fernandez Smith, and Guy (2012) 
aggregated control group data from three studies in which mock jurors rated a 
defendant’s psychopathic traits and rendered ultimate sentences absent of any expert 
testimony regarding psychopathy. Results indicate that participants’ death verdicts were 
highly associated with affective/interpersonal traits. This association was not as strong 
with either behavioral psychopathic traits or overall psychopathic ratings. These data 
suggest juror decision making may be influenced by specific psychopathic traits (i.e. 
affective/interpersonal) attributed to the defendant as opposed to a global psychopathy 
rating.   
Given that the Edens et al. (2012) data included undergraduate students 
exclusively, Cox, Clark, Edens, Smith, and Magyar (2013) attempted to extend these 
findings to a sample of representative community members. Participants reviewed a 
capital case vignette and rated the defendant on 30 personality characteristics 
theoretically associated with the psychopathy construct. Consistent with Edens et al. 
(2012) perceptions of affective and interpersonal traits significantly predicted support for 
the death penalty. In particular, jury member rating of the defendant’s remorselessness 
was particularly relevant in support for the death penalty.  
 Another study examined the relationship between various theoretically relevant 
constructs and lay participants’ perceptions of a fictional capital defendant’s 
psychopathic traits. Edens, Clark, Smith, Cox and Kelley (2013) provided a brief capital 
case vignette to 285 community members awaiting jury duty. Importantly, the 
description of the defendant was deliberately kept vague to ensure that participant 
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ratings of the defendant’s psychopathic traits were not based on concrete information 
about his behavior or antisocial conduct. Interestingly, layperson ratings of psychopathic 
features were significantly predicted by their perceptions of the defendant’s boldness, 
intelligence, future dangerousness, and “evilness.” These findings are generally 
consistent with previous research which suggest laypersons perceive psychopaths to be 
social adept and bright people, but also potentially dangerous and “evil” (Edens et al., 
2012; Guy & Edens, 2006; Helfgott, 1997).  
 Despite the abundance of laboratory research suggesting mental health testimony 
concerning psychopathy influences jury members, to date only one study has surveyed 
actual jury members about their perceptions of risk in sexually violent predator trials. To 
understand how these perceptions are related to offender obtained scores on risk 
measures, Boccaccini, Turner, Murrie, Henderson, and Chevalier (2013) surveyed actual 
jurors at the conclusion of 26 SVP trials about their perceptions of the respondents’ risk 
of reoffending. Results suggest defendants’ scores on various risk measures including 
the Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 2000), MnSOST-R (Epperson et al., 1998), and PCL-
R were not significantly predictive of jurors’ perceptions of dangerousness. In fact, the 
researchers concluded that there was no evidence that jurors were swayed by the risk 
measures at all. Although interesting, replication of this research is necessary before any 
definitive conclusions can be drawn.  
  In summary, research suggests psychopathy evidence has an impact on juror 
decision making, although the magnitude and implications of that impact remain 
somewhat unsettled (Boccaccini et al., 2013; Cox et al., 2010; Edens, 2001). Given the 
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high stakes of capital cases, a thorough understanding of how psychopathy influences 
legal decision making is imperative. Next we explore the method through which jurors 
process information and later examine how cognitive processing and expert testimony 
interact to impact juror decision making.  
1.10 Cognitive Experiential Self Theory 
 Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1973, 1991, 1994) holds 
that there are two major systems through which an individual processes information and 
adapts to the world. More primitive in nature, the experiential system encourages the 
automatic and effortless assessment of information. It is affect-driven and guides an 
individual’s processing and subsequent behavior through emotions and intuition. When 
employing the experiential system an individual is likely to think in a manner that is 
unreflective, categorical, personal, and action oriented (Epstein, 1994). In contrast, the 
rational system is an evolutionarily younger system that requires direct effort on the part 
of the individual. This system is analytical, relatively affect-free, and encodes 
information through the direct evaluation of data.  
 Notably, Epstein (1973) emphasizes that neither system is superior to the other. 
The experiential system is more fallible and may lead individuals to conclude events are 
causally related when, in actuality, they are only arbitrarily related. However, Epstein 
(1994) emphasizes that the experiential system is evolutionarily adaptive and better able 
to promote rapid assessment of stimuli. Importantly, when individuals are aware of the 
experiential system, they can actively engage in rational processing in an effort to 
override its influence (Epstein, 1991).  
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CEST assumes that all behavior is a joint effort between both the experiential and 
rational system (1973). Importantly, individual differences exist in the employment of 
each system and an individual’s ability to engage in one mode of information processing 
over the other is largely determined by an innate tendency to favor one system. 
However, effective training can promote individuals to engage in analytical thinking and 
hone rational processing skills (Epstein, 1991).   
A series of research findings have used the CEST model to explain various 
cognitive processes. Epstein, Denes-Raj, and Pacini (1995) examined the CEST 
conceptual framework and conjunction errors. Conjunction errors occur when one 
assumes that a combination of specific conditions is more probable than a single, more 
general, condition. A common example that appears in the social psychology literature is 
the “Linda problem” in which a woman is more likely to be identified as a bank teller 
and a feminist (as opposed to only a bank teller) based on descriptive information 
commonly associated with feminists (Epstein et al., 1995). Through a series of four 
studies examining CEST and conjunction errors, data suggest that priming participants 
for later concrete thinking resulted in subsequent rational processing. The authors 
concluded the CEST model sufficiently explained the tendency for people to engage in 
conjunction errors.  
A second study examined the concept of the worldview defense and CEST. 
Worldview defense is derived from terror management theory and states that one’s own 
awareness of one’s mortality amplifies one’s positive reactions to those who support 
one’s personal worldview and negative reactions to those who dispute one’s personal 
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worldview. Simon et al. (1996) found that participants who were encouraged to engage 
in experiential processing responded to mortality salience through increased worldview 
defense and death related thoughts. In contrast, participants who were encouraged to 
engage in rational processing (via written instructions) were less likely to respond to 
mortality salience with increased worldview defense. Results provide support for the 
fundamental assumptions of CEST, namely the presence of two distinct mechanisms for 
information processing.  
Finally, Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, and Huh (1992) examined CEST and 
counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking generally refers to the tendency of an 
individual to generate alternative outcomes to a negative event (Epstein et al., 1992). In a 
series of studies researchers presented participants with vignettes and asked them to 
respond to a variety of “if only” questions while engaging in either rational or 
experiential thinking. Results suggest priming the experiential system reduced 
participants’ ability to subsequently engage in rational thinking. The authors concluded 
the experiential system can successfully influence the rational system, lending support 
for the hypothesis that the two mechanisms, while distinct, are not completely 
independent.  
1.11 Measuring the CEST Dual-processing System 
 To adequately measure an individual’s dual-processing modes, Epstein, Pacini, 
Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) created the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). Now in 
its revised form, the self-report REI (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) measures an individual’s 
preferred method of information processing using two scales; the Need for Cognition 
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(NFC) scale assesses an individual’s tendency to rely on rational processing and the 
Faith in Intuition (FI) scale is designed to measure an individual’s inclination towards 
experiential processing. Each of the scales is further divided into two subscales. NFC 
Rational Ability refers to perceptions of a high level of ability to think analytically and 
logically. NFC Rational Favorability (also referred to as “Rational Engagement,” Pacini 
& Epstein, 1999) refers to a reliance on and preference for thinking in an analytical 
manner. In contrast FI Experiential Ability refers to a high level of ability with respect to 
intuitive impressions and gut instincts. Finally, FI Experiential Favorability (also 
referred to as “Experiential Engagement,” Pacini & Epstein, 1999) refers to reliance on 
gut feelings and intuitive impressions.  
 Pacini and Epstein (1999) determined NFC and FI scales are positively correlated 
to variables of theoretical interest, including measures of emotional expressivity and big 
five personality traits. Importantly, the two scales are not significantly correlated with 
each other, lending support for the orthogonal nature of the constructs. A number of 
studies have utilized the REI to examine information processing in a variety of contexts 
including examining the relationship between rational and experiential processing and 
working memory (Fletcher, Marks & Hine, 2012), self-esteem (Shimizu & Pelham, 
2011), gambling (Emond & Marmurek, 2010) and, importantly, juror biases (Gunnell & 
Ceci, 2010; McCabe, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010). A shortened version of the measure, 
the Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short (REI-S; Norris, Pacini, & Epstein, 1998) has 
also recently gained popularity as a method of assessing information processing 
(Finucane & Gullion, 2010; Lindeman, 2011; Silva, Bridges, & Metzger, 2005).  
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1.12 CEST and Juror Decision Making 
 Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, and Lehoux (2007) examined the effect of 
information processing and expert testimony type in a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) 
civil commitment hearing
5
. Undergraduate mock jurors were primed to engage in either 
experiential or rational processing through written instructions given by the hypothetical 
presiding judge. Participants then read a case vignette and either clinical opinion, guided 
professional judgment, or actuarial testimony. Participants who were experientially 
primed rated the defendant as more likely to engage in violent behavior in the future 
when they heard clinical expert testimony, as opposed to actuarial testimony (there was 
no significant difference between clinical opinion and guided professional judgment 
testimony). Interestingly, gender seemingly mediated this finding, in that women rated 
the defendant as a high likelihood for recidivism regardless of processing mode or 
testimony. Although interesting, this mediation effect is not unusual in studies 
examining juror verdicts of sexually violent predators (Guy & Edens, 2003, 2006) 
meaning women may consistently be more punitive when considering violence risk for 
sexual offenders. 
 In a follow up study, McCabe, Krauss, and Lieberman (2010) examined 
individual differences in information processing and how this related to expert testimony 
and juror decision-making. In contrast to previous studies, the researchers did not 
                                               
5 Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws have been enacted in many jurisdictions as a direct result of public 
concern regarding serial sexual offending. These laws allow for the indeterminate civil commitment of 
sexual offenders after the offender completes his or her allotted sentence as determined by a criminal 
court. Approximately 20 states, including Texas, have enacted some form of a SVP civil commitment law 
(Lieberman et al., 2007).  
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attempt to manipulate juror information processing and instead measured participant 
preferred method of processing. Participants completed the REI prior to viewing a 
simulated SVP civil commitment hearing via videotape. Included in the simulation was 
expert testimony, presented as either clinical or actuarial, cross-examination of the 
expert witness, closing arguments presented by both defense and prosecution lawyers, 
and final instructions given by the judge. Both undergraduate participants and jury-
eligible community members participated and results indicate undergraduate participants 
scored higher on measures designed to assess rational processing. There were no 
differences, however, between groups in terms of experiential processing. Interestingly, 
community mock jurors were more punitive and rated the defendant as more dangerous 
than undergraduate jurors; this finding was even more apparent when community jurors 
were exposed to clinical testimony, regardless of their initial preferred processing mode. 
Importantly, when researchers controlled for participant confidence in their verdict, 
processing mode was not a significant predictor in final verdict for either community or 
undergraduate participants.  
 These findings were further substantiated by Krauss, McCabe and Lieberman 
(2011) who examined whether differences in information processing styles accounted 
for dissimilarities between community and undergraduate mock jurors. The data 
suggested community participants were more likely to favor commitment of a SVP after 
hearing clinical testimony, regardless of their preferred processing style. In addition, 
community representative jurors reported being more confident in their verdicts when 
presented with clinical opinion testimony as opposed to actuarial testimony and rated 
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both types of testimony as equally scientific and influential in the decision-making 
process. In light of the USSC decision in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) this finding raises 
concerns about the ability of jurors to distinguish between empirically sound and 
scientifically based testimony versus more subjective, clinical opinion testimony.   
 Finally, Lieberman and Krauss (2009) examined the effect of testimony type and 
label familiarity on juror decision making in a SVP civil commitment hearing. 
Participants were primed to engage in either experiential or rational processing and then 
exposed to clinical opinion or actuarial testimony concerning a label that was considered 
familiar (“psychopath”) or unfamiliar (“pedophile”). Contrary to previous findings, 
participants who were rationally primed were more persuaded by clinical opinion 
testimony than actuarial testimony when the testimony was paired with the familiar 
diagnosis. This effect did not occur with the unfamiliar label. These findings raise 
interesting questions concerning the influential effect of a mental health diagnosis and 
whether this effect can override a rationally primed participant’s preference for actuarial 
testimony.   
 Currently, only one study has examined how information processing, as 
conceptualized by CEST, relates to juror decision making in a capital case. Krauss, 
Lieberman, and Olson (2004) administered Krauss and Sales’ (2001) original stimulus 
materials and attempted to manipulate juror processing through seemingly arbitrary 
tasks. Specifically, participants in the rational processing group were presented with a 
series of various mathematical equations and instructed to complete the calculations. 
Participants in the experiential group, on the other hand, were asked to draw a picture 
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describing their current emotional state. Results were as expected in that mock jurors 
were differentially influenced by actuarial or clinical testimony depending on their 
primed processing mindset. In addition, verdicts given by the experientially primed 
participants who were exposed to clinical testimony were the most robust, meaning, 
juror dangerousness ratings were not affected by adversarial procedures.  
1.13 Methodological Considerations in Mock Jury Research 
 Given that many of the studies discussed above have utilized undergraduate 
mock jurors (i.e., Cox et al., 2010; Edens et al., 2004; Guy & Edens, 2003; Krauss et al., 
2004; Krauss & Sales, 2001) the ecological validity of mock juror research should be 
briefly addressed. One of the most prominent questions of validity raised by psycholegal 
scholars in regards to mock jury research concerns the use of undergraduate students 
instead of community-dwelling jury eligible adults (Bornstein, 1999). Because of the 
general ease of access to undergraduate students, they have remained popular 
participants in mock jury studies despite questions regarding whether their data can 
generalize to the population as a whole (Sears, 1986). Bornstein (1999) reviewed 26 
studies which examined the differences between undergraduate and community member 
mock juror decisions. Although some studies found modest differences between student 
and nonstudent mock jurors (which, in general, indicated students may be less punitive 
than their community counterparts), overall, the majority of studies failed to find 
consistent differences. Bornstein (1999) concluded there is strong evidence that students 
and nonstudents respond to trial relevant factors in a similar manner. 
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A second methodological design element to consider is the presence of juror 
deliberations during the study procedures. A number of studies have demonstrated 
differences in juror decision making between pre- and post-deliberations when complex 
testimony or legal instructions are presented during trial (Diamond & Levi, 1996; 
Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). Citing these studies as well as a number of others, Diamond 
(1997) concluded that a lack of deliberation conditions is a genuine threat to external 
validity and a fundamental flaw in past and present jury research. These potential threats 
to validity are important to consider when examining the literature concerning juror 
decision making, expert testimony, and psychopathy. Specifically, a number of studies 
investigating these topics utilized undergraduate mock jurors and only one study (Krauss 
& Lee, 2003) included a deliberations portion of the selected protocol.  
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2. CURRENT STUDY 
Given the preceding literature review, a number of important research questions 
have yet to be addressed concerning the relationship between types of expert testimony, 
juror information processing mode, and juror decision-making in capital murder cases. 
One purpose of the current study was to expand on previous findings (Krauss & Sales, 
2001; Krauss & Lee, 2003) by manipulating forms of expert testimony and exploring the 
impact of this variable on jury decision making. Specifically, the impact of clinical 
opinion and actuarial testimony on participant verdict and ratings of defendant 
dangerousness was explored. In addition, this study is the first to examine the differential 
impact of types of expert testimony on mock juror’s perceptions of a defendant’s level of 
psychopathy and psychopathic traits.  
Second, the current study sought to understand how juror information processing 
affects juror ratings of a defendant on variables important in a capital context. 
Specifically, this study examined if experiential and rational information processing 
primes had a differential impact on decision making regarding verdict, ratings of future 
dangerousness, and perceptions of level of psychopathy and psychopathic traits. Finally, 
this study sought to understand if type of expert testimony and information processing 
prime interact to impact participant decision making.  
 To investigate these questions, participants were presented with a case vignette 
loosely based on the Coble v. Texas (2010) capital murder case. Prior to the presentation 
of stimulus materials, participant processing mode was measured in the context of 
preferences for rational and emotional processing. Utilizing a 2 X 2 design, participants 
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were then primed to employ a specific processing mode (experiential vs. rational) and 
read different types of psychological expert testimony (clinical opinion vs. actuarial). In 
each condition the prosecution expert opined that the defendant was a high likelihood for 
future violence and a psychopath, after which the expert for the defense asserted that he 
was a low likelihood for future violence and not a psychopath. Testimony-type was 
counterbalanced such that prosecution actuarial testimony was always contradicted by 
defense clinical opinion testimony and prosecution clinical opinion testimony was 
always contradicted by defense actuarial testimony. 
After reading through stimulus materials, participants voted for a sentence of 
either life in prison (without the possibility of parole) or death. Next, participants rated 
the likelihood that the defendant presented a continuing threat to society. Participants 
then rated the defendant on various theoretically and historically relevant personality and 
behavioral traits loosely based on the PCL-R (Hare, 2003) as well as made ratings 
concerning the importance of different types of evidence (e.g., expert testimony, facts of 
the crime) on their decision making. Finally, to increase the external validity of these 
findings, the participants recruited from the TAMU Department of Psychology 
Undergraduate Participant Pool participated in small group deliberations before 
rendering a final verdict, dangerousness ratings, and ratings of global psychopathy and 
psychopathic traits.   
Based on the findings of Lieberman et al. (2007), Lieberman and Krauss (2007), 
and Krauss et al. (2004) it was hypothesized participants who were first exposed to 
prosecution clinical opinion testimony would be more punitive (i.e., more likely to 
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sentence the defendant to death and view him as more dangerous and psychopathic) than 
participants who were first exposed to prosecution actuarial testimony. In addition, it 
was hypothesized that experientially primed participants would be more punitive (i.e., 
more likely to sentence the defendant to death and view him as more dangerous and 
psychopathic) than rationally primed participants.  
Further, it was hypothesized that experientially primed participants would be 
more punitive (i.e., more likely to sentence the defendant to death and view him as more 
dangerous and psychopathic) when experiencing prosecution clinical opinion expert 
testimony asserting the defendant was a high likelihood for future dangerousness. In 
contrast, rationally primed participants would be more likely to sentence the defendant to 
death when experiencing prosecution actuarial testimony asserting the defendant was a 
high likelihood for future dangerousness (see Table 2).  
Finally, considering the potential relationship between participant preferred 
processing mode and decision making (Krauss, McCabe & Lieberman, 2011) it was 
hypothesized that REI-S FI scores would be positively correlated with death verdicts, 
ratings of future dangerousness, global ratings of psychopathy and psychopathic traits. In 
contrast, REI-S NFC scores would demonstrate no relationship with ratings of future 
dangerousness, global ratings of psychopathy and psychopathic traits.  
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Table 2. 
Hypotheses.  
 
 
Condition 
  
 
Prime 
 
Expert for the 
Prosecution  
 
Expert for 
the Defense  
 
Hypothesized 
participant 
rating  
1  Experiential  Clinical testimony, 
high likelihood of 
violence/Psychopathy 
Actuarial 
testimony, 
low 
likelihood of 
violence/No 
psychopathy 
Death 
penalty; High 
likelihood for 
future 
violence; 
High 
psychopathy 
 
2 
  
Experiential 
 
Actuarial testimony, 
high likelihood of 
violence/Psychopathy 
 
Clinical 
testimony, 
low 
likelihood of 
violence/No 
psychopathy 
 
Life in prison; 
Low 
likelihood for 
future 
violence; Low 
psychopathy 
 
3 
  
Rational 
 
Clinical testimony, 
high likelihood of 
violence/Psychopathy 
 
Actuarial 
testimony, 
low 
likelihood of 
violence/No 
psychopathy 
 
Life in prison; 
Low 
likelihood for 
future 
violence; Low 
psychopathy 
 
4 
  
Rational 
 
Actuarial testimony, 
high likelihood of 
violence/Psychopathy 
 
Clinical 
testimony, 
low 
likelihood of 
violence/No 
psychopathy 
 
Death 
penalty; High 
likelihood for 
future 
violence; 
High 
psychopathy 
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3. METHOD 
3.1 Participants 
Undergraduate sample. Two groups of participants were recruited for this study. 
One hundred and thirty-six undergraduate students enrolled in the Texas A&M 
University Department of Psychology Undergraduate Participant Pool participated in 
study procedures and were included in final analyses. This sample included 91 women 
(66.9%) and 45 men (33.1%) with a mean age of 18.52 years (SD = .81). The majority of 
participants identified themselves as Caucasian (69.9%) followed by Hispanic (19.1%), 
African American (3.7%), or “other” (7.4%). In terms of religious affiliation, 
participants mostly identified as a sect of Christianity. Finally, in terms of political 
affiliation, participants largely identified with the Republican Party (see Tables 3 & 4). 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
 
Undergraduate Sample Religious Beliefs.  
Religion Frequency Percent 
Catholic 42 30.9 
Other 33 24.3 
Protestant (non-Evangelical) 30 22.1 
Protestant (Evangelical) 22 16.2 
Jewish 3 2.2 
Hindu 2 1.5 
Muslim 1 .7 
Note. Data missing from three participants. 
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Table 4. 
 
Undergraduate Sample Political Affiliation. 
Political Affiliation Frequency Percent 
Republican 72 52.9 
Democrat 22 16.2 
Independent 18 13.2 
Other 16 11.8 
Libertarian 5 3.7 
Note. Data missing from three participants. 
 
 
 
Community Sample. Some researchers have questioned the generalizability of 
using undergraduate students as mock jurors (e.g., Diamond, 1997), given the 
demographic differences between undergraduate students and community members (see 
Bornstein, 1999). For this reason, community members were recruited for participation 
through the online marketplace, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is a 
relatively new “marketplace” that allows companies and researchers to recruit 
individuals from across the world to complete surveys and experiments. Studies that 
have evaluated the representativeness of this method of recruitment have generated fairly 
positive results. Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) found that the MTurk sample 
is more representative of the US population than other internet accessible samples and is 
significantly more diverse than typical samples of undergraduate college students. 
Importantly, the authors also argued the data collected from MTurk participants met or 
exceeded psychometric standards reported in standard internet samples. However, Ross, 
 42 
 
Zaldivar, Irani, and Tomlinson (2010) found MTurk participants are somewhat younger 
and more educated than the U.S. population. Utilization of this sample allows for a more 
demographically diverse sample and increases the generalizability of this study.  
Recruited participants were initially compensated $0.50 for their time. Due to 
initial low recruitment rates, however, this amount was increased to $1.50. To increase 
the ecological validity, recruitment was restricted to U.S. citizens over the age of 18. A 
total of 123 MTurk workers were included in final analyses. Participants consisted of 71 
women (57.7%) and 52 men (42.3%) with an average age of 38.26 (SD = 11.76). The 
majority of participants were Caucasian (83.9%) followed by “other” (8.9%), Hispanic 
(4.0%) and African American (3.2%). In terms of education, the majority of participants 
had a high school diploma or equivalent (33.9%), whereas 31.5% completed a four-year 
college degree, 15.3% had completed post-graduate courses, 14.5% completed some 
college courses, and 2.4% had not completed high school (with data missing from three 
participants). Participants were diverse in terms of their religious beliefs and political 
affiliation (see Tables 5 & 6). 
 
 
 
Table 5. 
 
Community Sample Religious Beliefs.  
Religion Frequency Percent 
Catholic 17 13.7% 
Other 58 46.8% 
Protestant (non-Evangelical) 22 17.7% 
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Table 5 Continued.  
Religion Frequency Percent 
Protestant (Evangelical) 16 12.9% 
Jewish 2 1.6% 
Hindu 5 4.0% 
Muslim 2 1.6% 
Note. Data missing from two participants.  
 
 
 
Table 6. 
 
Community Sample Political Affiliation.  
Political Affiliation Frequency Percent 
Republican 10 8.1% 
Democrat 59 47.6% 
Independent 42 33.9% 
Other 5 4.0% 
Libertarian 2 1.6% 
Note. Data missing from three participants. 
 
 
 
3.2 Materials 
Demographic and Death Qualification Questionnaire. Participants completed a 
demographic questionnaire (Appendix A) inquiring about their age, race/ethnicity, 
gender, political affiliation, and religious affiliation. In addition, participants were asked 
two questions to assess if they would be willing to impose a sentence of death if the 
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prosecution sought such a punishment and if they would be able to consider all possible 
sentencing options (i.e., death penalty and life in prison without the possibility of parole) 
available in a capital case. Such questions are necessary to ensure the generalizability of 
the sample, particularly in light of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), in which the USSC 
held that prospective jurors may be excluded from service if their attitudes concerning 
the death penalty would affect their ability to impartially determine a person’s guilt or 
innocence, and Lockhart v. McCree (1986), in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the death-qualification process.  
Rational-Experiential Inventory-Short. The REI- S (Appendix B) is a 24-item 
likert-type survey designed to measure an individual’s preferences in information 
processing. The measure includes two subscales; the 12-item Need for Cognition scale 
(NFC; α = .85) which assesses an individual’s rational processing and the 12-item Faith 
in Intuition scale (FI; α = .91), which emphasizes a pre-conscious affective processing 
style. Epstein et al. (1996) demonstrated the validity of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory, from which the REI-S was derived. In addition, a number of studies have 
utilized the REI-S to measure experiential and rational processing styles (Finucane, & 
Gullion, 2010; Lindeman, 2011; Silva et al., 2005).  
Experimental Stimuli: The Case. Simulated capital case material (Appendix C) 
was loosely based on the Texas death penalty case, Coble v. State (2010). The 
description of the crime was taken directly from the reported case with slight 
modifications made for purposes of brevity. In addition, some circumstances of the 
crime were altered to decrease the likelihood of overly high base rates of support for a 
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death sentence for the defendant (i.e., the number of victims was decreased). The 
defendant, Billie Wayne Coble, was ultimately found guilty of capital murder and 
sentenced to death.  
Prosecution Clinical Opinion Testimony/Defense Actuarial Testimony. Expert 
testimony concerning defendant dangerousness and level of psychopathy was presented 
as part of the trial transcript during which both prosecution and defense mental health 
expert witnesses provided evidence solicited by the retaining attorneys. Both testimonies 
consisted of statements concerning: (1) the witness’s education and experience, (2) the 
clinical interview conducted with the defendant, (3) the witness’ opinion concerning the 
defendant’s level of psychopathy, (4) the witness’s opinion concerning the defendant’s 
likelihood of committing a future violent act. 
The prosecution’s expert witness opined that the defendant was a high likelihood 
to reoffend and met criteria for psychopathy. The expert explained that this opinion was 
based on his years of experience and a 2.5 hour interview with the defendant (i.e., 
clinical opinion). In contrast, the defense’s expert witness asserted that the defendant 
was a low likelihood to reoffend and did not meet criteria for psychopathy. This 
testimony also included affirmation that his opinion was based on a 2.5 hour clinical 
interview with the defendant as well as data gathered using standard psychological risk 
assessment measures (i.e., actuarial; see Appendix F) 
 Prosecution Actuarial Testimony/Defense Clinical Opinion Testimony. As 
explained in the above condition, expert testimony concerning defendant dangerousness 
and level of psychopathy was presented as part of the trial transcript during which both 
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prosecution and defense mental health expert witnesses provided evidence. Again, both 
testimonies consisted of statements concerning: (1) the witness’ education and 
experience, (2) the clinical interview conducted with the defendant, (3) the witness’s 
opinion concerning the defendant’s level of psychopathy, (4) the witness’s opinion 
concerning the defendant’s likelihood of committing a future violent act. 
In this condition, the prosecution’s expert witnesses opined that the defendant 
was a high likelihood to reoffend and met criteria for psychopathy based on a 2.5 hour 
interview with the defendant and data gathered from standardized risk assessment 
measures (i.e., actuarial). In contrast, the defense’s expert witness asserted that the 
defendant was a low likelihood to reoffend and did not meet criteria for psychopathy. He 
based his testimony on a 2.5 hour clinical interview with the defendant and his clinical 
experience (i.e., clinical opinion; see Appendix G).   
 In each condition the education and level of experience for both experts was 
comparable. In addition, to avoid a confound where actuarial testimony was more 
complex than clinical testimony and thus less comprehended by participants, every effort 
was made to present the actuarial testimony in an easy to understand manner (Lieberman 
et al., 2007).  
 Manipulation Instructions. Prior to reading through the stimulus materials 
participants were given written instructions concerning their obligation in a death 
penalty case. Consistent with Texas case law (Jurek v. Texas, 1976), instructions 
specified that participants consider two issues:  
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1. Will the defendant constitute a continuing threat to society? That is, is there a 
likelihood that the defendant will commit violent criminal acts in the future?  
2. Taking into account the defendant’s background, character, and the 
circumstances of the crime, is there sufficient justification for the crime that 
would warrant a sentence of life in prison rather than death?  
In order for a death penalty to be imposed, the participant must have determined the 
answer to the first question was “yes” and the answer to the second question was “no.” 
In all other cases, the participant was instructed to impose a sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.  
 Similar to other studies that have successfully primed participants to employ 
either a rational or experiential mindset (e.g., Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman et 
al., 2007), embedded in these instructions were statements designed to provoke a 
specific mindset for the participant. Participants in the experiential processing mode 
condition were instructed to “…go with your gut feeling… consider your initial intuitive 
response” (Appendix E). Participants in the rational processing mode condition were 
instructed to “…logically consider all of the evidence presented. Try to be as rational 
and analytical as possible” (Appendix D).  
Dependent Measure: Case Evaluation form. Following the initial presentation of 
expert testimony the dependent variables were assessed via the case evaluation form 
(Appendix H). The case evaluation form focused on participants’ reactions to four 
general areas of interest. First, participants were asked to decide which sentence they 
would impose given the information that they received: life in prison with no possibility 
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of parole or the death penalty. Second, participants were asked to rate (on a scale from 0 
to 100) the likelihood that the defendant would commit another violent crime (including 
murder) if given a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
Participants then rated (on a scale from 0 to 100) how “psychopathic” they 
believed the defendant to be. Finally, participants rated the defendant on twenty 
personality traits generally associated with the psychopathy construct. Utilized in 
previous research to assess lay person perception of psychopathy (Cox et al., 2013; 
Edens et al., 2012), these items were loosely based on the trait labels of the PCL-R with 
some elaboration on items for illustrative purposes. For example, “Irresponsibility” was 
described as “Irresponsible behavior (such as owes money, poor work history, drunk 
driving)” and “Shallow affect” was described as “Shallow emotions (e.g., cold or 
generally unemotional).” This was done to decrease the possibility of participant 
confusion due to complex and/or clinical verbiage. 
 Dependent Measure: Evidence Rating Form. In response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Furman v. Georgia (1972), states were required to establish structured rules 
regarding which evidence should be considered in capital sentencing hearings (see 
Edens, 2001). Previous studies have evaluated how participants respond to specific 
aggravating factors, such as a history of past offenses and the heinousness of the current 
offense (although Texas law technically does not allow for a direct consideration of 
these factors in sentencing determinations). Although prior research has suggested that 
participants rate the defendant’s past offenses as more influential in their decision 
making than expert testimony or current offense (Krauss et al., 2011), this effect might 
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be moderated by processing mode (Lieberman et al., 2007). Consistent with the 
guidelines specified in Furman v. Georgia (1972) and to clarify the findings of earlier 
studies, participants completed likert-scale (1-7) ratings of the extent to which specific 
aggravating and mitigating evidence were influential in their decision making processes 
(Appendix I).   
Comprehension questionnaire. To eliminate threats to internal validity due to 
lack of participant motivation or comprehension, participants answered three multiple 
choice questions to assess their understanding of basic facts of the case (Appendix J).  
Manipulation Check. Finally, participants completed four multiple choice 
questions to assess their comprehension of manipulation instructions (Appendix K). 
Each question focused on a specific aspect of the manipulation instructions (i.e. 
processing mode, type of expert testimony). Participants were removed from analyses if 
they answered more than one item incorrectly.  
Participants also completed seven likert-scale items to evaluate the extent to 
which they employed an experiential mindset (Manipulation Check- Post-procedures 
Experientiality; Appendix L). Although it was originally proposed that participants 
would complete the entire REI-S at this point in the procedures, after consultation with 
an expert in cognitive processing and decision making, it was determined that this would 
not accurately reflect the level of priming because participants could be influenced by 
their earlier responses on the items (H. Lench, personal communication, April 16, 2013). 
Instead, seven items from the REI-S FI scale were chosen and slightly reworded to 
decrease item familiarity and the likelihood that participant ratings would be influenced 
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by their earlier responses on the REI-S items. The seven items were compiled to create a 
new scale and scores on this scale were computed by summing of each of the items.  
3.3 Procedure 
A total of 303 participants were recruited for this study. One hundred and fifty 
undergraduate participants were recruited through the TAMU Psychology Department’s 
Sona System and given a time slot to appear at the location in which the experiment was 
conducted. To increase the external validity of the deliberations portion of the 
experiment, groups of 6-12 participants
6
 completed the study during a single testing 
session.  
In addition, 153 MTurk workers completed the study through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. After logging onto the website, participants selected the study from a 
list of studies on the MTurk website. To provide participants with a brief description of 
the study the link was accompanied by the sentence “read a short vignette about a capital 
murder case and answer questions about your thoughts and opinions.” Participants were 
only granted access to the study if, while registering as an MTurk participant, they 
identified as over the age of 18 a United States citizen. If participants met these criteria 
and they selected this study, they were given access to a link routing them to the online 
platform, Qualtrics, from where they completed the study. Qualtrics is a web-based 
system that allows for the creation and implementation of customized comprehensive 
surveys and is available for use by faculty, staff and students of the TAMU system. The 
                                               
6 In Williams v. Florida (1970) the USSC ruled that a jury of six people was sufficient to meet the sixth 
amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury.  However, the majority of jurisdictions continue to require a jury 
of twelve for criminal cases (Greene, Heilbrun, Fortune, & Nietzel, 2007).  
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link to the Qualtrics study was active on MTurk for 98 days; the online marketplace 
format does not allow for the assessment of the number of people who attempted to 
access the link but were either unable or unwilling to complete the study protocol.  
Prior to beginning study protocol participants were informed that their 
participation was voluntary and they could withdrawal at any time. After completing the 
informed consent process participants were given a packet and instructed to complete the 
materials in the order in which they were presented. To encourage participant motivation 
and attention to stimulus materials (Matz & Wood, 2005) undergraduate participants 
were also informed prior to beginning study procedures that they would be expected to 
deliberate with their peers and defend their decision making. 
Following the informed consent process, participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire. Noted above, as part of the demographic questionnaire participants were 
asked about their views concerning the death penalty to ensure they would be willing to 
consider all possible sentencing options in a capital case (Lockhart v. McCree, 1987). 
Participants who acknowledged that they would be unwilling to consider the death 
penalty under any circumstances or who reported that they would automatically impose 
the death penalty if the defendant was found guilty were deemed not “death qualified” 
and removed from further analyses (undergraduate sample n = 10, MTurk sample n = 
19). In addition, participants who failed to accurately respond to questions regarding 
basic facts of the case (undergraduate sample n = 5, MTurk sample n = 11) were also 
removed from final analyses.   
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After the demographic questionnaire participants completed the REI-S (Norris, 
Pacini, & Epstein, 1998). Participants were then cognitively primed utilizing an 
experimental procedure consistent with Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, and Lehoux (2007). 
After undergoing the experimental procedure, participants were presented with a short 
description of the Texas death penalty case, Coble v. State (2010) followed by expert 
testimony presented by the prosecution that was either clinical opinion or actuarial in 
nature. Regardless of the type of testimony, the content stated that the expert witness 
believed the defendant to be a high likelihood for future violence and a psychopath.  
 Following presentation of the prosecution’s expert testimony, participants 
reviewed the testimony provided by the defense’s expert witness. This testimony was 
counterbalanced with the prosecution’s expert testimony. When the prosecution’s expert 
testified that the defendant was a high likelihood for future violence using clinical 
opinion methods, the defense’s expert testified that he was a low likelihood for future 
violence using actuarial methods (and vice versa). 
After reading through the above materials, participants completed the Case 
Evaluation Form and Evidence Rating Form assessing for specific variables of interest. 
In addition, to ensure participants appropriately attended to case information, they 
completed three multiple choice questions concerning basic facts of the case. Finally, to 
assess the effectiveness of the priming procedure participants completed four multiple-
choice questions to evaluate if they understood the priming instructions as well as the 
seven item manipulation check scale to evaluate the effectiveness of the priming 
instructions on their mode of processing.  
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 After individually completing the above protocol, participants were informed that 
they must reach a group consensus on which verdict to impose: life in prison without the 
possibility of parole or death. Consistent with a previous study employing similar 
methodology (Krauss & Lee, 2003), participants were given 15 minutes to discuss the 
facts of the case and deliberate. Regardless of whether participants reached a consensus, 
after 15 minutes the experimenter returned and participants again completed the Case 
Evaluation and Evidence Ratings forms.  
 After recruitment through MTurk, community participants completed the above 
protocol via the online survey system, Qualtrics. Participants logged onto the survey 
system and completed the materials in the order presented above. However, given that 
this population completed the protocol online, no deliberations portion was possible.  
3.4 Planned Analyses 
 Verdict. A binomial logistic regression was utilized to examine the effects of 
testimony type (actuarial vs. clinical opinion) and priming (rational vs. experiential) on 
participant verdict. This statistical analysis is appropriate to investigate the relationship 
between a dichotomous dependent variable (verdict) and two or more independent 
variables of any measurement scale. 
Given the previous findings suggesting a relationship between participant 
preferred information processing and decision making (Krauss, McCabe & Lieberman, 
2011), a second binomial logistic regression was utilized to examine the effects of 
testimony type and prime on participant verdict while statistically controlling for REI-S 
NFC and FI scores. Controlling for these potentially confounding variables was 
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appropriate to account for unique differences in participants’ responses that may not be 
due to the independent variable. In addition, the inclusion of covariates may eliminate 
some systematic variance that is otherwise not able to be controlled.  
Dangerousness and Psychopathy Ratings. To examine the effects of testimony 
type (actuarial vs. clinical opinion) and priming (rational vs. experiential) on participant 
ratings of defendant likelihood of future violence, a 2 X 2 analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was utilized. An analysis of variance is appropriate when comparing one 
dependent variable (dangerousness ratings) in two groups (testimony type, priming 
condition). Identical analyses were conducted to examine the effects of testimony type 
and prime on ratings of the likelihood of future murder, global ratings of psychopathy, 
and PCL-R Total and Factor scores.  
 In addition, 2 X 2 analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted to control 
for potential variance from confounding variables (REI-S NFC and FI) that might impact 
the dependent measures. Controlling for these confounding variables was appropriate to 
account for unique differences in participants’ responses that may not be due to the 
independent variables.  
Exploratory analyses. Exploratory analyses were also conducted to examine 
various areas of theoretical and methodological interest. Specifically, analyses were 
conducted to investigate participant ratings of evidence important in their decision 
making processes. In addition, analyses were also conducted to examine the effect of 
deliberations on dependent variables of interest.  
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4. RESULTS  
4.1 Primary Analyses  
Verdict. A binomial logistic regression was utilized to examine the effects of 
testimony type (actuarial vs. clinical opinion) and priming (rational vs. experiential) on 
participant verdict. The independent variables of prime and testimony as well as the 
interaction were entered into the equation simultaneously, as there was no theoretical 
reason to enter the variables in a step-wise fashion. Results suggest neither testimony (β 
= -.06, SE = .39) nor prime (β = .08, SE = .40) independently significantly predicted 
juror verdict ratings. In addition, these variables did not interact to significantly predict 
juror verdict ratings (β = -.12, SE = .55; R2= .0017; χ2(3) = .23, p = .97). 
Future Dangerousness ratings. Participants rated the defendant’s future 
dangerousness through two likert-type items measuring the defendant’s likelihood of 
committing another violent act and the defendant’s likelihood of committing another 
murder. On a scale ranging from 0-100% the participants rated the defendant, on 
average, a 56.29% (SD = 27.03) likelihood to commit a future violent act.  
The effect of testimony and priming on future violence ratings was first 
examined using an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results approached significance for 
testimony (see Table 7), with participants in the prosecution clinical opinion condition 
rating the defendant more highly (M = 59.59, SD = 26.69) than participants in the 
prosecution actuarial condition (M = 53.31, SD = 27.08). No significant difference was 
found between ratings of experientially primed participants, (M = 56.46, SD = 27.81) 
                                               
7 Cox & Snell measure (Field, 2005) 
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and participants rationally primed (M = 56.12, SD = 26.32; see Table 7). For the 
interaction between testimony type and prime on future dangerousness ratings results 
were non-significant (see Table 7) suggesting prime and testimony did not interact to 
significantly impact juror ratings of defendant future dangerousness.  
 Participants also rated the likelihood that the defendant would commit a future 
murder, (M = 46.72, SD = 26.67). The effect of testimony and priming on future murder 
ratings was examined using an ANOVA. No significant difference between ratings of 
participants exposed to prosecution clinical opinion testimony (M = 48.46, SD = 26.27) 
and those exposed to prosecution actuarial testimony (M = 45.15, SD = 27.03; see Table 
7). Examining the main effect of prime, no significant differences were found between 
experientially primed (M = 46.85, SD = 26.80) and rationally primed (M = 46.59, SD = 
26.65) participants (see Table 7).  The interaction between prime and testimony type was 
non-significant, suggesting prime and testimony did not interact to significantly impact 
juror ratings of defendant future dangerousness.  
 Global Psychopathy Ratings. Participants completed multiple ratings of the 
defendant’s level of psychopathy including global ratings of psychopathy and ratings on 
each of the PCL-R’s 20 items. In terms of global psychopathy ratings (likert-type scale 
ranging from 0-100), participants rated the defendant as fairly psychopathic (M = 71.24, 
SD = 20.80).  
The effect of testimony and priming on participant global psychopathy ratings 
was analyzed. Results indicated a significant effect of testimony (see Table 7) with 
participants hearing clinical opinion evidence from the prosecution rating the defendant 
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as more psychopathic (M = 74.39, SD = 18.38) than participants hearing actuarial 
evidence from the prosecution (M = 68.38, SD = 22.45). No significant difference was 
found between participants experientially primed (M = 72.15, SD = 21.64) and those 
participants rationally primed, (M = 70.31, SD = 19.96; see Table 7). Finally, for the 
interaction of testimony type and prime results were non-significant (see Table 7), 
suggesting prime and testimony did not interact to significantly affect global 
psychopathy ratings (see Table 7).  
 PCL-R Total Score Ratings. Next, the effect of testimony and priming on PCL-R 
total score ratings was analyzed using an ANOVA. Results suggest no significant effect 
of testimony on participant ratings of the defendant’s PCL-R Total score (see Table 7), 
with similar means between prosecution clinical opinion testimony (M = 30.01, SD = 
5.73) and actuarial testimony (M = 29.29, SD = 6.64). Further, there was no significant 
difference between mean ratings of participants primed experientially (M = 29.74, SD = 
6.03) and participant primed rationally (M = 29.63, SD = 6.43; see Table 7). Finally, the 
interaction between testimony type and prime was also non-significant (see Table 7) 
suggest testimony and prime did not interact to significantly affect PCL-R Total score 
ratings.  
 PCL-R Factor Ratings. Participant ratings of defendant psychopathic traits in 
terms of PCL-R Factor 1 and 2 were also examined. In terms of participant ratings of 
PCL-R Factor 1 traits, an ANOVA indicated testimony type had a significant effect on 
participant ratings (see Table 7) with participants exposed to prosecution clinical opinion 
testimony rating the defendant significantly higher on PCL-R Factor 1 items (M = 13.11, 
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SD = 2.48) than participants who heard prosecution actuarial testimony (M = 11.75, SD 
= 3.45). However, prime did not have a significant effect on ratings (see Table 7), with 
no significant differences between mean ratings for experientially primed participants 
(M = 12.55, SD = 3.10) and rationally primed participants, (M = 12.23, SD = 3.23). 
Further, the interaction between testimony and prime on PCL-R Factor 1 ratings was 
non-significant (Table 7) suggesting testimony type and prime did not interact to 
significantly impact PCL-R Factor 1 ratings.   
An ANOVA examined the influence of testimony type and prime on participant 
Factor 2 ratings. No significant difference was found between prosecution clinical 
opinion ratings (M = 14.04, SD = 3.45) and actuarial ratings (M = 14.58, SD = 3.49) of 
PCL-R Factor 2 ratings (see Table 7). In addition, no significant difference was found 
between ratings for experientially primed participants (M = 14.28, SD = 3.47) and 
rationally primed participants, (M = 14.32, SD = 3.61; see Table 7). Finally, for the 
interaction between testimony type and prime on PCL-R Factor 2 ratings, results were 
non-significant (see Table 7) suggesting testimony type and prime did not interact to 
significantly influence PCL-R Factor 2 ratings.  
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Table 7. 
Effect of Priming and Testimony on Decision Making Outcome Variables.  
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
F p Cohen’s d 
Likelihood of 
future violent act 
    
Prime .003 .95 .01 
Testimony 3.54 .06 .23 
Prime*Testimony 1.62 .20  
Likelihood of 
future murder 
    
Prime 0.01 .91 .01 
Testimony 0.99 .32 .13 
Prime*Testimony 0.18 .68  
Global 
psychopathy 
ratings 
    
Prime 0.56 .48 .09 
Testimony  5.49 .02* .29 
Prime*Testimony  .002 .97  
PCL-R Total 
Ratings 
    
Prime 0.05 .82 .04 
Testimony 0.89 .35 .12 
Prime*Testimony 1.35 .25  
PCL-R Factor 1 
Ratings  
    
Prime  0.56 .46 .09 
Testimony 12.99 .001** .45 
Prime*Testimony 0.17 .68  
PCL-R Factor 2 
Ratings 
    
Prime 0.02 .90 .01 
Testimony 1.40 .24 .16 
Prime*Testimony 0.88 .35 .01 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
  
 
 
Taken together, the above results suggest a modest trend for testimony type to 
impact dependent variables, specifically variables concerning psychopathy ratings. 
However, the independent variable of prime did not have a significant impact on any of 
the dependent variables. Further, the null findings for the interactions between testimony 
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type and prime suggest these variables did not interact to significantly affect verdict, 
dangerousness ratings, or perceptions of psychopathy
8
.   
Relationship between REI-S Scores and Dependent Variables. Given the 
possibility that participant preferred processing mode may act as a confounding variable 
in the previous analyses (Krauss, McCabe & Lieberman, 2011), the correlational 
relationships between REI-S scores and dependent variables were examined. As 
demonstrated in Table 8, REI-S FI and NFC were significantly correlated with various 
dependent variables
9
. For this reason, primary analyses were rerun including REI-S FI 
and NFC scores in analyses as covariates. This was done to better understand the effect 
of testimony on each dependent variable while controlling for the effect of preferred 
processing. Although the independent variable of prime did not have a significant impact 
on any of the dependent variables, in theory this variable could have a significant impact 
after controlling for REI-S scores. For this reason, this variable remained in analyses. 
 
 
                                               
8 An analysis of dependent variables post-deliberations found similar significant effects. Specifically, 
multiple ANOVAs indicate participants in the clinical opinion testimony rated the defendant as globally 
more psychopathic (M = 74.58, SD = 18.97) than participants in the actuarial condition (M = 60.13, SD = 
23.59), F(1, 132) = 14.95, p = .001. In addition, participants in the clinical opinion condition rated the 
defendant higher on the PCL-R Total score (M = 32.36, SD = 5.29) than participants in the actuarial 
condition (M = 29.76, SD = 6.80), F(1, 131) = 5.88, p = .017. Finally, participants who were exposed to 
clinical opinion testimony rated the defendant higher on PCL-R Factor 1 traits (M = 14.08, SD = 2.08) 
than participants in the actuarial condition (M = 11.54, SD = 3.54), F(1, 131) = 24.33, p = .001.  
9 Given the effect of testimony type on various dependent variables, data was split between testimony 
groups and correlations between REI-S FI and NFC scores and dependent variables were also examined. 
Both subsamples, clinical opinion testimony and actuarial testimony, demonstrated significant effects for 
the same dependent various. Specifically, in both clinical opinion and actuarial subgroups REI-S FI was 
significantly correlated with global psychopathy ratings, PCL-R Total ratings, and PCL-R Factors 1 and 2 
ratings. In addition, in both subgroups REI-S NFC was significantly associated with global psychopathy 
ratings and PCL-R Factor 1 ratings.  
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Table 8. 
Pearson Correlation Matrix. 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Faith in Intuition 
(FI) 
 
--        
2 Need for 
Cognition (NFC) 
.10 --       
 
3 Likelihood of 
future violence  
 
.03 
 
.10 
 
-- 
     
 
4 Likelihood of 
future murder 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
.81** 
 
-- 
    
 
5 Global 
psychopathy ratings 
 
.15* 
 
.17** 
 
.53** 
 
.53** 
 
-- 
   
 
6 PCL-R Total 
Scale 
 
.30** 
 
.09 
 
.23** 
 
.22** 
 
.37** 
 
-- 
  
 
7 PCL-R Factor 1 
 
.23** 
 
.16** 
 
.29** 
 
.28** 
 
.45** 
 
.81** 
 
-- 
 
 
8 PCL-R Factor 2 
 
.28** 
 
.02 
 
.12 
 
.12 
 
.22** 
 
.89** 
 
.48 
 
-- 
*p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
4.2 Analyses Controlling for REI-S Experientiality and Rationality 
Verdict. To understand the effect of testimony type (actuarial vs. clinical opinion) 
and prime (experiential vs. rational) on participant sentencing decisions while 
statistically controlling for participant REI-S scores, a binomial logistic regression was 
utilized. Results suggest neither testimony (β = -.10, SE = .40) nor prime (β = -.02, SE = 
.40) independently significantly predicted juror verdict ratings after entering REI-S 
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scores on a preceding block. In addition, these variables did not interact to significantly 
predict juror verdict ratings (β = -.05, SE = .56; R2= .0210; χ2(3) = .26, p = .97). 
Future Dangerousness & Psychopathy Ratings. As demonstrated in Table 9, 
after statistically controlling for REI-S FI and NFC scores, multiple two-way analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVA) suggest testimony type demonstrated a significant effect on 
participants’ global psychopathy ratings and PCL-R Factor 1 ratings. No other 
significant effects were found. These analyses suggest testimony type significantly 
influenced participants’ perceptions of the defendant’s level of psychopathy and 
affective/interpersonal psychopathy traits even after holding participant preferred 
processing mode constant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 Cox & Snell measure (Field, 2005) 
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Table 9. 
Effect of Priming and Testimony on Decision Making Outcome Variables Controlling for 
REI-S FI and NFC scores. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
F p Cohen’s d 
Likelihood of 
future violent act 
    
Prime 0.04 .85 .01 
Testimony 3.53 .06 .23 
Prime*Testimony 1.93 .16  
Likelihood of 
future murder 
    
Prime .001 .99 .01 
Testimony 1.00 .32 .13 
Prime*Testimony .138 .71  
Global 
psychopathy 
ratings 
    
Prime 0.13 .72 .09 
Testimony  5.81 .02* .29 
Prime*Testimony  0.02 .89  
PCL-R Total 
Ratings 
    
Prime .001 .99 .04 
Testimony 0.29 .29 .12 
Prime*Testimony 1.68 .20  
PCL-R Factor 1 
Ratings  
    
Prime  0.18 .67 .09 
Testimony 14.38 .001** .45 
Prime*Testimony 0.33 .57  
PCL-R Factor 2 
Ratings 
    
Prime 0.04 .84 .01 
Testimony 1.50 .22 .16 
Prime*Testimony 1.05 .31  
*p < .05; **p < .01.  
 
 
 
4.3 Effect of Prime 
Participant Preferred Processing. Outlined above, initial analyses indicated the 
independent variable of prime did not have a significant effect on any of the dependent 
variables, even after controlling for participant preferred processing. This is surprising 
given the previous studies that have demonstrated this variable can significantly 
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influence juror decision making (Lieberman et al., 2007). For this reason, subsequent 
analyses investigated possible explanations for this variable’s non-significant effects.  
Prior to investigating the (in)effectiveness of the prime variable, it is first 
necessary to understand participant preferred processing measured pre-procedures by the 
REI-S. Participants obtained significantly higher NFC scores compared to FI scores, 
t(258) = -4.92, p = .001, d = .41 (see Table 10). Previous studies have reported mean 
NFC item ratings lower than the 3.78 obtained in this sample. For example, Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) reported an average rating of 3.39 (SD = 0.61) for NFC items with a 
sample of undergraduate participants and Fletcher, Marks, and Hine (2012) reported an 
average rating of 3.67 (SD = 0.60) with adult community members. In addition, on the FI 
scale this sample made an average rating of 3.52, which is similar to ratings reported in 
previous samples (M = 3.52, SD = 0.47; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; M = 3.44, SD = .58; 
Fletcher, Marks & Hine, 2012). Notably, the correlation between the scales with this 
sample was non-significant: .10 (p = .107).  
 
 
 
Table 10. 
 
Total REI-S Scores. 
 Mean(SD) 
(N = 259) 
 
NFC  
 
45.36(6.99) 
Rational Ability  23.31(3.53) 
Rational Favorability  22.05(4.49) 
 
FI  
 
42.23(8.08) 
Experiential Ability  21.52(4.24) 
Experiential Favorability  20.71(4.36) 
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 A one-way ANOVA indicated no significant differences in FI scores between 
participants who were subsequently experientially primed (M = 42.34, SD = 7.94) versus 
rationally primed (M = 42.13, SD = 8.38), F(1, 257) = .04, p = .84. However, a 
significant difference was found in NFC scores, F(1, 257) = 5.25, p = .02, with 
participants subsequently randomly assigned to the experiential priming group obtaining 
higher pre-prime NFC scores (M = 46.34, SD = 6.53) than participants randomly 
assigned to the rational priming group (M = 44.36, SD = 7.35). The difference is 
relatively small, suggesting the large sample size may have contributed to the statistical 
significance. Despite this, these analyses suggest a failure of random assignment may 
have occurred; meaning experimental groups differed significantly in levels of FI and 
NFC prior to exposure to the independent variables. Given these differences, adequate 
measurement and understanding the effectiveness of the prime is difficult. 
Analyses indicate the priming variable had no significant effect on any of the 
measured dependent variables. This was surprising given that the manipulation 
procedures utilized in this study were almost identical to those used in previous studies 
(Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2007). In both of the earlier studies 
authors concluded the manipulation instructions were successful in priming participants 
to employ a specific mindset. To better understand this finding, we attempted to 
statistically quantify the effectiveness of the priming instructions through measuring 
participant experiential thinking post-procedures and comparing this to participant 
experiential thinking pre-procedures (as measured by the REI-S).  
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 Post-procedure experiential thinking was measured through seven likert-type 
questions (Manipulation Check- Post-procedures Experientiality) completed by 
participants at the conclusion of study procedures. These questions were summed and 
compared to the seven original questions on the REI-S FI scale from which they were 
derived. When participants were primed to process information emotionally it was 
expected that their experientiality scores would increase. However, when participants 
were primed to process information rationally it was expected that there would be no 
change in their experientiality scores due to the independence of the rational and 
experiential systems. Using the Huynh-Feldt correction (Field, 2005) a repeated 
measures ANOVA indicated no significant differences between pre- and post- 
experientiality scores F(1, 257) = .011, p = .917. These results suggest the priming 
instructions did not significantly affect participant mode of information processing (see 
Table 11).  
 
 
 
Table 11. 
 
Pre- and Post-Experientiality Score Means. 
  Pre-procedures 
M(SD) 
Post-procedures 
M(SD) 
Prime Experiential  24.07(5.16) 22.95(2.26) 
  
Rational 
 
23.99(5.24) 
 
22.95(2.34) 
  
Total 
 
24.03(5.19) 
 
22.95(2.30) 
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 Given that similar priming instructions were successfully utilized in previous 
research (Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2007) the ineffectiveness of the 
prime in this study is puzzling. Multiple statistical approaches were utilized to better 
understand what mechanisms may have been at play with these specific data.  
 Discordant vs. concordant priming. It is possible that participant preferred 
processing (as measured by their REI-S obtained scores) influenced susceptibility to the 
priming manipulation. Meaning, participants who experienced priming instructions 
concordant with the method through which they process information may have been 
more susceptible to that prime than participants whose preference for processing 
information was discordant with the priming instructions (e.g., participants high on NFC 
primed rationally vs. participants high on NFC primed experientially).  
To investigate this, participants were placed into categories based on the 
relationship between their preferred processing mode and priming instructions. The 
“concordant experiential” group consisted of participants who scored higher than 75% 
on the REI-S FI scale and were given the experiential priming instructions. The 
“concordant rational” group consisted of participants who scored higher than 75% on the 
REI-S NFC scale and were given rational priming instructions. In contrast, the 
“discordant experiential” group consisted of participants who scored higher than 75% on 
the REI-S FI scale and were given rational priming instructions while the “discordant 
rational” group was composed of participants who scored higher than 75% on the REI-S 
NFC scale and were given experiential priming instructions.  For the purpose of these 
 68 
 
exploratory analyses, participants who scored 75% or higher on both scales were not 
included in either group
11
.   
Interestingly, Concordant Rational participants obtained significantly higher 
post-procedures experientiality scores, t(24) = -3.26, p = .001 compared to pre-
procedures. Discordant Rational participants also obtained higher post-procedures 
experientiality scores, t(43) = -2.17, p = .03. In contrast, both Concordant Experiential 
participants, t(19) = 7.34, p = .001, and Discordant Experiential participants, t(20) = 
8.22, p = .001, obtained scored significantly lower post-procedures experientiality 
scores. Using this approach, each of the groups significantly altered their level of 
experientiality processing, although the direction was not always as expected. The 
Discordant Rational group did obtain significantly higher experientiality scores, as was 
expected. However, the group of participants who obtained high pre-procedure 
experientiality scores and were primed to process emotionally (Concordant Experiential) 
obtained significantly lower post-procedure experientiality scores. Interestingly, 
although initially the groups had almost a ten-point range in pre-procedure scores, the 
differences between groups post-procedures almost disappeared, with the biggest 
difference (1.60 points) existing between the two Concordant groups (see Table 12).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11 No participant scored below 75% on both NFC and FI.  
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Table 12. 
 
Concordant v. Discordant Processing and REI-S FI Scores.  
 N Pre-procedures 
experientiality 
M(SD) 
Post-procedures 
experientiality 
M(SD) 
Concordant Experiential 20 28.43(1.93) 23.80(2.04) 
Concordant Rational  25 19.20(5.21) 22.20(2.87) 
Discordant Experiential  21 28.57(2.46) 23.14(2.08) 
Discordant Rational   44 20.81(4.19) 22.39(2.19) 
 
 
 
 Difference scores. An alternative approached was utilized to place participants in 
concordant and discordant processing groups. Specifically, difference scores were 
calculated subtracting participant pre-NFC Scores from pre-FI scores (see Gunnell & 
Ceci, 2010, for a similar approach). Any participant obtaining a positive score was 
considered to prefer experiential processing and was placed in the “Concordant 
Experiential” group if they received the experiential prime and “Discordant 
Experiential” group if they received the rational prime. Any participant obtaining a 
negative score was placed in the “Concordant Rational” group if they received the 
rational prime and the “Discordant Rational” if they received the experiential prime. For 
the purpose of these exploratory analyses, any participant obtaining a score of zero (n = 
10) was excluded from further analyses.  
Contrary to expectations, participants who preferred experiential processing and 
were primed to process experientially (Concordant Experiential) obtained significantly 
lower post-procedures experientiality scores, t(43) = 5.20, p = .001. However, 
participants who preferred rational processing and were primed to process experientially 
(Discordant Rational) obtained almost identical pre- and post-procedures experientiality 
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scores, t(80) = -.58, p = .56 (see Table 13). Surprisingly, experientiality scores for the 
Concordant Rational group increased post-procedures, although this difference was not 
significant, t(61) = -1.49, p = .14. In contrast, experientiality scores for the Discordant 
Experiential group significantly decreased post-procedures, t(61) = 5.40, p = .001. 
Again, despite the range in pre-procedure experientiality scores between groups, these 
differences greatly diminish post-procedures.  
 
 
 
Table 13. 
 
Difference Scores and REI-S FI Items.  
 N Pre-procedures 
experientiality 
M(SD) 
Post-procedures 
experientiality 
M(SD) 
Concordant Experiential 44 27.27(4.02) 23.57(1.82) 
Concordant Rational  62 21.44(5.24) 22.37(2.35) 
Discordant Experiential  62 26.52(3.99) 23.56(2.24) 
Discordant Rational   81 22.22(4.71) 22.53(2.37) 
 
 
 
4.4 Sample Differences 
 As previously outlined, data was collected from a sample of undergraduate 
participants and jury eligible community members. Analyses were conducted to examine 
the differences between these groups; in terms of preferred processing mode, as 
measured by the REI-S, no significant differences between samples were found (see 
Table 14).  
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Table 14. 
  
Undergraduate and Community Samples REI-S Scores.  
 Undergraduate  
(N = 136) 
Community 
 (N = 123) 
Mean Comparisons 
 Mean(SD) Mean(SD) t(df) p 
NFC  44.72(6.79) 46.05(7.18) -1.53(258) .126 
Rational Ability  23.08(3.70) 23.55(3.34) -1.07(258) .286 
Rational Favorability  21.64(4.08) 22.50(4.87) -1.55(258) .123 
FI 42.55(6.16) 41.88(9.77) .67(258) .503 
Experiential Ability  21.51(3.46) 21.54(4.97) -.06(258) .956 
Experiential Favorability  21.64(4.08) 20.34(5.17) 1.30(258) .195 
Note. NFC = Need for Cognition. FI = Faith in Intuition.  
 
 
 
 Sample differences in verdict and dangerousness ratings. To understand the 
difference between samples on participant sentencing decisions a crosstabs chi-square 
analysis was conducted. Results suggest undergraduate participants were significantly 
less likely to sentence the defendant to death than their community counterparts 
χ2(1, N = 258) = 3.95, p = .05. 
 After statistically controlling for Prime Type and Expert Testimony, a one-way 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) suggests undergraduate participants rated the 
defendant as significantly less likely to commit a future violent act (M = 50.81, SD = 
24.53) than community participants (M = 62.36, SD = 28.43), F(1, 255) = 11.29, p = 
.001, d = .44. In addition, undergraduate participants also rated the defendant as 
significantly less likely to commit a future murder (M = 40.74, SD = 23.18) compared to 
community participants (M = 53.33, SD = 28.74), F(1, 255) = 14.54, p = .001 d = .48. 
Sample differences in psychopathy ratings. Participant ratings of global levels of 
psychopathy and psychopathic traits were also broken down by sample. Interestingly, 
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community participants rated the defendant significantly higher in terms of level of 
global psychopathy, however, undergraduate participants scored the defendant higher on 
PCL-R items. This difference was likely driven by Factor 2 ratings (see Table 15).  
 
 
 
 Table 15. 
Between Group Comparisons of Mean Psychopathy Ratings.  
 Undergraduate  
(N = 136) 
Community  
(N = 123) 
Mean 
Comparisons 
Effect 
sizes 
 M(SD) M(SD) F(df) p d 
Global 
Psychopathy  
67.06(19.89) 75.85(20.88) 10.84(1, 255) .001** .43 
 
PCL-R Total  
 
30.76(5.27) 
 
28.38(6.94) 
 
9.28(1, 247) 
 
.003** 
 
.39 
 
Factor 1 
 
12.40(2.80) 
 
12.39(3.41) 
 
.086(1, 247) 
 
.77 
 
.03 
 
Factor 2  
 
15.15(2.95) 
 
13.41(3.78) 
 
15.55(1, 248) 
 
.001** 
 
.51 
*p < .05; **p < .01.  
 
 
 
4.5 Exploratory Analyses 
 A number of exploratory analyses were conducted to better understand the 
relationship between participant processing, expert testimony, and various variables 
potentially important in a capital trial.   
 Evidence Ratings. Following completion of the psychopathy ratings, participants 
completed likert-scale ratings of eleven different pieces of evidence they may have 
considered while rendering their decisions. These items were aggregated into three 
categories: evidence related to defendant characteristics (e.g., Mr. Coble’s current age, 
the abuse Mr. Coble sustained during childhood), evidence concerning the crime (e.g., 
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the number of people Mr. Coble killed, the heinousness of the murders), and evidence 
given by expert witnesses (e.g., actuarial evidence concerning future dangerousness, 
clinical evidence concerning future dangerousness). These variables were then rescaled 
to employ a common metric. As demonstrated in Table 16, participants were most likely 
to consider evidence concerning the crime as influential in their decision making, and 
least likely to consider evidence concerning the defendant. 
 
 
 
Table 16. 
 
Mean Differences Between Ratings of Influence of Evidence Type.  
 M(SD) t(df) P 
Evidence 
concerning the 
crime 
 
28.74(5.35) 86.38(258) .001* 
Evidence 
concerning the 
defendant 
18.21(5.47) 53.24(255) .001* 
 
Evidence 
concerning expert 
testimony  
 
24.89(6.55) 
 
61.07(257) 
 
.001* 
*p < .05.  
 
 
 
Testimony Type and Evidence Ratings. To better understand the differences 
between testimony type on evidence ratings, three one-way ANCOVAs were conducted, 
controlling for participant preferred processing. In terms of evidence concerning the 
crime, no significant differences were found between participants who read actuarial 
testimony presented by the prosecution (M = 28.86, SD = 5.31) and participants who 
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read clinical opinion testimony presented by the prosecution (M = 28.61, SD = 5.429), 
F(1, 255) = .121, p = .73. In addition, in terms of evidence concerning expert testimony, 
there were no significant differences between ratings for participants who read clinical 
opinion testimony presented by the prosecution (M = 24.90, SD = 6.69) and participants 
who read actuarial testimony presented by the prosecution (M = 24.89, SD = 6.44), F(1, 
255) = .001, p = .98. However, mean ratings for evidence concerning defendant 
characteristics approached significance, F(1, 255) = 3.22, p = .07, with participants 
reading prosecution actuarial testimony (M = 18.80, SD = 5.82) producing higher ratings 
than participants reading prosecution clinical opinion testimony (M = 17.57, SD = 5.00).   
Processing Mode and Evidence Ratings. A simple linear regression was utilized 
to predict participant ratings of evidence from their obtained REI-S FI and NFC. The 
two independent variables were entered into the equation simultaneously as there was no 
theoretical reason to enter one variable before the other.  
In terms of ratings of evidence concerning expert testimony, results suggest REI-
S FI and NFC scores were not significantly predictive of participant ratings, R
2
 = .003 
F(2, 255) = .36, p = .70, and only accounted for .3% of the variance in this dependent 
variable. Neither NFC (β = .02, p = .74) nor FI (β = .05, p = .46) significantly predicted 
participant ratings of expert testimony evidence.  
In terms of evidence concerning the defendant results suggest 4% of the variance 
in participant ratings can be attributed to REI-S FI and NFC scores, R
2
 = .04 F(2, 255) = 
5.25, p = .006. This effect was likely driven by NFC, which was significantly predictive 
of participant ratings (β = -.19, p = .002), while FI was not (β = .04, p = .48). Finally, 5% 
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of the variance in evidence concerning the crime was explained by participant 
processing mode (R
2
 = .05 F(1, 256) = 6.94, p = .001) with both NFC (β = .13, p = .04) 
and FI (β = .17, p = .005) acting as significant predictors.  
 Effect of deliberations on decision-making. To increase the ecological validity of 
this study, undergraduate participants participated in a deliberations activity during 
which they were instructed to discuss the relevant facts of the case and reach a group 
consensus on the most appropriate verdict. Juror ratings were measured prior to and 
following the deliberations activity.   
A McNemar test was conducted to examine differences in ultimate verdict pre-
and post-deliberations. A McNemar’s test is a non-parametric test appropriate to 
compare paired proportions. Analyses indicated no significant difference between pre- 
and post-deliberations verdicts, p = .66 (see Table 17). However, an item level analysis 
of the data indicated approximately 14% of participants (n = 21) changed their verdicts 
following the deliberations activity. An examination of the frequency counts suggest the 
number of participants choosing a death verdict was higher post-deliberations while the 
number of participants choosing a life verdict was lower post-deliberations. However, 
the overall frequency change was quite small, (n = 3), suggesting participants changed 
their verdicts in both directions.  
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Table 17. 
Participant Sentencing Verdicts Pre- and Post-Deliberations. 
 Post-deliberations 
Pre-deliberations Life Death Total 
Life 
                Observed 
                Expected 
 
89.0 
74.4 
 
12.0 
26.6 
 
101.0 
101.0 
Death 
                Observed 
                Expected 
 
Total  
 
9.0 
23.6 
 
98.0 
 
23.0 
8.4 
 
35.0 
 
32.0 
32.0 
 
133.0 
    
 
 
 
Considering psychopathy ratings, when controlling for participant preferred 
processing mode, a number of significant effects were found (see Table 18). 
Specifically, participants in the prosecution actuarial testimony condition rated the 
defendant as globally less psychopathic following deliberations while participants in the 
prosecution clinical opinion condition rated the defendant as significantly more 
psychopathic. The change in Total PCL-R ratings was likely driven by the change in 
Factor 1 ratings.  
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Table 18. 
 
Effect of Deliberations on Juror Decision-Making 
 Pre-
Deliberations 
Post-
Deliberations 
Mean Comparisons 
 Mean(SD) Mean(SD) F(df) p 
Future 
Dangerousness 
    
Prosecution 
Actuarial   
48.44(24.77) 50.65(27.21) 
Prosecution 
Clinical  
53.90(24.07) 53.05(26.41) 
   1.05(1, 132)    .31 
Future Murder     
Prosecution 
Actuarial   
39.48(23.89) 42.27(28.61)   
Prosecution 
Clinical  
42.37(22.31) 41.36(26.88)   
   1.51(1, 132)    .22 
Global 
Psychopathy 
Ratings 
    
Prosecution 
Actuarial 
64.68(21.92) 60.13(23.59)   
Prosecution 
Clinical 
70.17(16.56) 74.58(18.97)   
   9.23(1, 132) .003* 
PCL Total 
Ratings 
    
Prosecution 
Actuarial 
30.26(5.86) 29.76(6.80)   
Prosecution 
Clinical 
31.41(4.42) 32.36(5.29)   
   6.13(1, 131) .015* 
PCL Factor 1 
Ratings 
    
Prosecution 
Actuarial 
11.64(3.16) 11.54(3.54)   
Prosecution 
Clinical 
13.38(1.91) 14.08(2.08)   
   5.24(1, 131)  .024* 
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Table 18 Continued.  
 Pre-
Deliberations 
Post-
Deliberations 
Mean Comparisons 
 Mean(SD) Mean(SD) F(df) p 
PCL Factor 2 
Ratings 
    
Prosecution 
Actuarial  
15.38(2.98) 15.17(3.45)   
Prosecution 
Clinical 
14.86(2.93) 15.12(3.39)   
   1.73(1, 131) .19    
*p < .05. 
 79 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to better understand how different forms of expert 
testimony and juror information processing influence decision making in a capital case. 
Specifically, this study investigated the effect of clinical opinion and actuarial testimony 
on juror verdicts, as well as juror ratings of defendant dangerousness, level of 
psychopathy, and psychopathic traits. In addition, procedures attempted to manipulate 
the method by which mock jurors process information (i.e., experientially or rationally) 
to better understand how an individual’s information processing system influences juror 
decision making. These data suggest that juror ultimate verdict (death vs. life in prison 
without the possibility of parole) was not significantly influenced by the means through 
which testimony type and priming were manipulated in this study. In addition, testimony 
type did not significantly influence ratings of future dangerousness, although this finding 
did approach statistical significance.  
These data are contradictory to previous studies that have consistently found 
clinical opinion testimony is more influential than actuarial testimony (Krauss & Lee, 
2003; Krauss, Lieberman & Olson, 2004; Krauss & Sales, 2001). The reasoning for this 
discrepancy is unclear but may lie in the stimulus materials and methodological design. 
The stimulus materials, including case summary and expert testimony, were created 
specifically for this study. A large portion of the previous research in this area has 
utilized a different set of materials that was identical, or slightly altered, between studies 
(Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss Lieberman & Olson, 2004; Krauss & Sales, 2001). The 
capital case described in these materials (Moore v. State, 1976) included a confession 
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and a summary of the defendant’s crimes based on Marquart, Ekland-Olson, and 
Sorensen’s (1989) study of criminal defendants adjudicated as dangerous by capital 
sentencing juries in Texas. It is possible that the differences in the description of the 
defendant’s criminal history and/or the instant offense may have resulted in these 
discrepant findings.  
A major difference in this study’s methodology from that of previous research 
concerns the presentation of the expert testimony. Specifically, this study presented one 
type of expert evidence (e.g., prosecution clinical opinion) which was always 
counterbalanced with the opposite modality (e.g., defense actuarial). Meaning, 
participants were always exposed to both clinical opinion and actuarial testimony. This 
differs somewhat from previous studies (Krauss & Sales, 2001; Krauss & Lee, 2003) 
which included one form of expert testimony (e.g., prosecution clinical opinion) 
followed by cross-examination of the witness, and concluding with rebuttal testimony 
which was either clinical opinion or actuarial. The rebuttal testimony varied between 
conditions such that initial actuarial testimony was rebutted by both clinical opinion and 
actuarial testimony. Another approach was utilized by McCabe, Krauss, and Lieberman 
(2010) and Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger, and Lehoux (2007) and included initial expert 
testimony (presented as either clinical opinion or actuarial) and cross-examination. A 
third approach included initial expert testimony (presented as either clinical opinion or 
actuarial), cross-examination, and opening and closing arguments by the attorneys from 
the respective sides (Krauss, McCabe, & Lieberman, 2011).  
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The manipulation of cross-examination of the expert witness was considered but 
ultimately omitted from this study based on the mostly null findings by Krauss and Sales 
(2001) of this manipulation on participant decision making. However, Krauss, 
Lieberman and Olson (2004) concluded cross-examination did have an effect on juror 
decision making and it is possible that inclusion of this manipulation may have produced 
different results.  
Consistent with the majority of the mock jury research (see Bornstein et al., 
1999) the materials in this study were presented as written material and participants were 
required to read through the instructions, case vignette, expert testimony and measures 
of the dependent variables. This is consistent with some of the prior studies examining 
similar questions (Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2007). However, other 
studies in this area have presented trial procedures or expert testimony through video 
recordings (Krauss, McCabe, & Lieberman, 2011; Krauss & Sales, 2001; McCabe, 
Krauss & Lieberman, 2010). It is possible that differences of presentation modalities 
could account for the discrepant findings between studies.  Bornstein (1999) examined 
20 years of jury simulation research to investigate the impact of trial presentation 
medium including the use of audio and videotaped testimony and confessions. He 
concluded trial presentation medium did not have a significant effect in the majority of 
studies. However, the sample size (n = 11) was small and is now somewhat outdated. 
For this reason, the possibility that differences in case presentations may have impacted 
these findings is tentative. If aspects of the case (e.g., the presence of a defendant 
confession), method through which the testimony is described, or presence of adversarial 
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procedures resulted in a significant influence on participant decision making, the real 
world implications could be significant.  
It should be noted that participants in each condition grossly overestimated the 
extent to which the defendant represents a continuing threat to society. Specifically, 
participants estimated the defendant presented a 56.29% (SD = 27.03) likelihood to 
commit a future violent act even if given a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. Further, participants estimated the likelihood that the defendant 
would commit a future murder (even if given a sentence of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole) at a staggering 46.71% (SD = 26.67). Although consistent with 
previous literature measuring layperson views of capital defendant future dangerousness 
(Cox, DeMatteo, & Foster, 2010; Edens et al., 2004) these perceptions are extremely 
discordant with actual violence base rates of former death row inmates and capital 
defendants subsequently sentenced to life in prison (Cunningham, Reidy, & Sorensen, 
2007, 2008, Cunningham, Sorensen, & Reidy, 2009; Edens et al., 2005; Sorensen & 
Pilgrim, 2000). Further, the description of this defendant included in the case summary 
materials did not include any information to suggest he would be a part of the small 
percentage of capital prison inmates who do commit a violent act while incarcerated. 
These misperceptions are troubling and indicate a need for juror education concerning 
prison violence base rates and the (in)accuracy of mental health expert future 
dangerousness assertions (Edens et al., 2005).  
 A primary goal of this study was to advance the current literature concerning 
participant perceptions of defendant psychopathic traits. Participants rated the defendant 
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as fairly psychopathic both on the global psychopathy ratings as well as the PCL-R Total 
scores. Hypotheses were somewhat supported, in that participants exposed to 
prosecution clinical opinion testimony rated the defendant significantly higher on both 
global psychopathy ratings and PCL-R Factor 1 ratings. This effect remained even after 
statistically controlling for REI-S FI and NFC scores, suggesting clinical opinion 
testimony influenced global psychopathy and Factor 1 ratings after holding participants’ 
processing mode constant.  
Although testimony type did not have a significant effect on total PCL-R scores, 
ratings of Factor 1 traits were significantly influenced by this variable. Specifically, 
participants who read clinical opinion testimony rated the defendant as higher on 
psychopathy traits such as superficial charm, conning, and lack of empathy. This is 
perhaps not surprising, considering PCL-R Factor 1 measures fairly subjective 
personality characteristics and clinical opinion testimony relies on the expert’s 
subjective judgment and professional experience.  
The Story Model of persuasion (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983) offers a 
possible explanation for these findings. This theory holds that individuals construct 
mental stories incorporating preexisting beliefs and the information in front of them. It is 
possible that the narrative nature of clinical opinion testimony makes this testimony 
more appealing to individuals. Jurors may find this type of testimony easier to 
incorporate into the narration of the case presented during the trial. In contrast, the 
scientific and statistical jargon included within actuarial testimony may be more difficult 
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for jurors to perceive as relevant to the defendant and case in question (Krauss & Sales, 
2001). 
Although potentially a factor with these data, the different conditions included 
similar language so as to decrease the likelihood that participants would have difficulty 
comprehending actuarial testimony (Lieberman et al., 2007). In practice, actuarial 
testimony is likely to include complex statistical conclusions and scientific language. In 
addition, in real world testimony the descriptions of the risk assessment measures are 
likely to include more in depth item explanations, resulting in a decrease in face validity. 
For example, on the VRAG an offender’s score will decrease if they have any female 
victim or if they have committed murder. Although this scoring system resulted in the 
most accurate predictions of future violent behavior (at least in the VRAG derivation 
sample) at face value it is perplexing. It is possible that including a more in depth 
explanation of the risk assessment measures and their items may have resulted in 
differential effects on participant decision making.        
5.1 Information Processing Prime 
Consistent with previous literature (Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman, et 
al., 2007), it was hypothesized that participants would be more likely to employ an 
experiential mindset when they were encouraged to think about case information 
intuitively and using their gut instinct. Additionally, it was hypothesized that participants 
who were encouraged to think about case information in an analytical and logical 
manner would be more likely to employ a rational mindset. To test these hypotheses, 
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participant preferred processing mode was measured prior to the specific prime, and then 
again following ratings of the dependent variables.  
 Contrary to hypotheses, participants primed to employ an experiential mindset 
did not obtain higher post-procedures experientiality scores, suggesting they did not 
respond to the primes in the expected manner. In fact, when participants were placed 
into groups based on their preferred processing mode and priming condition (Concordant 
vs. Discordant), analyses indicated those in the experiential priming condition received 
significantly lower post-manipulation experientiality scores. Furthermore, despite the 
wide range in pre-procedures experientiality scores between groups, this difference 
almost disappeared post-procedures. This suggests some aspect of the study procedures 
resulted in participants being less likely to process information in an emotional and 
intuitive manner.  
 Although previous researchers found significant effects using similar priming 
instructions (Lieberman & Krauss, 2009; Lieberman, et al., 2007), the method through 
which these researchers measured the effectiveness of the prime differed. Specifically, 
Lieberman and Krauss (2009) asked participants to rate the extent to which their 
decisions were based on their “gut level personal feelings” and “rational and analytic 
consideration of the evidence” (p. 32). Given that individuals are susceptible to 
numerous cognitive biases and are not always aware of the methods through which they 
make decisions (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993), this study sought to 
measure the effectiveness of the prime in a less overt manner.   
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Although it is possible that an alternative manipulation check may have 
suggested participants were effectively primed, this is not likely given there were also no 
significant effects of the priming condition on decision making. Considering the 
statistical evidence, the most defensible conclusion is that the priming instructions were 
not successful in persuading participants to alter the method through which they 
processed information about the case at hand.  
There are a number of potential explanations for the ineffectiveness of the 
priming instructions. Participants in this sample obtained a higher mean item rating on 
REI-S NFC items than those reported in other samples (Fletcher, Marks, & Hine, 2012; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Although there is no evidence that rational thinkers are less 
likely to be influenced by artificial primes, it is reasonable to suggest that individuals 
high in rationality may be less likely to alter their processing mode based solely on 
written priming instructions. In addition, it is possible that the prime was initially 
effective, meaning participants initially processed information using the respective 
modalities, however, this effect may have diminished in the length of time between the 
prime and participant ratings of the dependent variables. Although there is no agreed 
upon amount of time in which cognitive processing primes are believed to be effective, 
an expert in the field of cognitive processing opined that any influential effect of a prime 
decreases soon after the prime is presented (H. Lench, personal communication, August 
15, 2013). It is possible that the length of time between priming procedures and ratings 
of the dependent variables may account for the seeming ineffectiveness of the prime.  
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Future research should replicate this methodology to attempt to clarify 
discrepancies between these data and those reported by Lieberman and Krauss (2007). In 
addition, investigation into alternative methods of priming participants may demonstrate 
more success in altering participant processing mode. For example, participants in the 
Krauss, Lieberman, and Olson (2004) study completed activities meant to prime either a 
rational or experiential mindset; participants in the rational condition completed a sheet 
of math problems while participants in the experiential condition were asked to draw a 
picture that described their current emotional state. This type of priming procedure was 
considered for this study, however, the present approach of instructions from the judge 
was chosen because it is more ecologically valid than Krauss, Lieberman, and Olson’s 
(2004) approach and demonstrated success in previous research (Lieberman & Krauss, 
2009; Lieberman, Krauss, Kyger & Lehoux, 2007). Although there is no evidence that 
the priming instructions were effective in the present study, given the evidence of 
priming success demonstrated in previous literature, it would be premature to conclude 
that it is not possible to prime individuals to alter the method through which they process 
information in mock jury simulations.  
5.2 Sample Differences 
Participants in this study obtained high scores on the NFC scale, suggesting they 
perceive themselves as rational and analytical thinkers. These perceptions held across 
the two independent samples, with no significant differences found between 
undergraduate and community participants in terms of their preference for rational or 
experiential thinking.  
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 This finding is somewhat surprising given what is known about demographic 
differences between undergraduate and community samples (Bornstein, 1999) as well as 
McCabe, Krauss, and Lieberman’s 2010 study in which undergraduate participants 
scored significantly higher than a community representative sample on the NFC scale. 
The lack of a difference in this data may be attributed to the population from which this 
sample was drawn. Although the MTurk sample was included in this study to obtain 
greater demographic heterogeneity and increase the study’s generalizability, this 
population has received some criticism for being somewhat younger and more educated 
than the U.S. population (Ross, Zaldivar, Irani, & Tomlinson, 2010). In fact, over 95% 
of MTurk participants in this study received a high school diploma or some equivalent, 
compared to 87.65% of the 2012 United States population over the age of 25 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2012). Meaning, while the MTurk participants were included to increase 
the likelihood of a more representative sample, and this was likely obtained for specific 
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, political affiliation), this sample did not differ 
from undergraduate participants on other important traits (e.g., level of education, 
processing mode preferences).  
 Mentioned previously, this sample obtained significantly higher NFC scores 
compared to FI scores. The REI-S NFC scale is an abbreviated version of Cacioppo’s 
Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1984) and previous 
research has shown negative but non-significant relationships between age and NFC 
scores (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). This sample actually 
demonstrated a non-significant positive correlation between NFC and age, suggesting 
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older participants had a tendency to perceive themselves as favoring rational processing. 
Given that roughly half of the current sample included undergraduates aged from 18-22 
years of age, it is reasonable to speculate that a more normal age distribution might 
result in a significant positive correlation between age and NFC. More research is 
needed to understand how NFC scores change over time.  
 The two samples were also compared in terms of differences in dependent 
variables while controlling for testimony type and information processing prime. 
Undergraduates were less likely to sentence the defendant to death than the community 
member participants. Undergraduates also perceived the defendant as significantly less 
likely to commit a future violent act and significantly less likely to commit a murder.  
These findings are consistent with previous research which has found community 
representative mock jurors are more punitive to undergraduate samples (McCabe, Krauss 
& Lieberman, 2009). In contrast, undergraduate participants rated the defendant 
significantly higher on PCL-R items, driven specifically by higher ratings of Factor 2 
items. These findings suggest undergraduates may be less punitive than community 
representative mock jurors. However, they are more likely to perceive a defendant as 
higher on specific psychopathic traits, specifically traits related to an antisocial lifestyle. 
These differences between samples are notable and suggest future research should 
consider the representativeness of the sample before drawing any general conclusions.  
5.3 Perceptions of Evidence 
 Across conditions, participants rated evidence concerning aspects of the crime as 
highly influential in their decision making, suggesting mock jurors at least perceive 
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themselves as weighing facts like the number of murder victims and the heinousness of 
the crime as highly important in their decision making. In addition, participants rated this 
evidence as more influential than psychological expert testimony and evidence 
concerning the defendant’s characteristics.  
No difference between conditions was found for participant ratings of the 
importance of expert testimony, suggesting participants who heard prosecution clinical 
opinion testimony were no more likely to rate it as important in their decision making 
than participants who heard prosecution actuarial testimony. This finding may be 
attributed to the fact that participants were exposed to both clinical opinion testimony 
and actuarial testimony, with the side in which the testimony was presented varying 
between conditions. Further, as discussed above, both forms of testimony used similar 
language and could be considered mostly face valid. Little information differed between 
conditions, with the main difference being an inclusion of risk measures for the actuarial 
testimony. It is possible that the lack of a difference in participant ratings of evidence 
importance between conditions can be attributed to the similarities in language and 
presentation between the two conditions. Perhaps the participants did not differentiate 
between the two types of testimony in terms of importance because, at least on the 
surface, the participants did not see a noticeable difference between conditions. 
Regardless of the underlying reason behind this null finding, the lack of difference 
between these ratings is troubling given the USSC ruling in Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 
which asserted jurors are able to distinguish between mental health evidence that is 
scientifically based from evidence that lacks empirical support.  
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5.4 Impact of Deliberations 
 A strength of this study methodology was the measurement of juror decision 
making prior to and following a deliberations activity. These data suggest the 
deliberations portion was an important aspect of the decision making process, 
particularly in regards to psychopathy ratings. Global psychopathy ratings, PCL-R Total 
ratings, and Factor 1 ratings significantly differed pre- and post-deliberations. This effect 
was particularly apparent for global psychopathy ratings with participants exposed to 
prosecution clinical opinion expert testimony rating the defendant as more psychopathic 
following deliberations and participants exposed to prosecution actuarial testimony 
rating the defendant less psychopathic following deliberations. This finding implies there 
is something about the deliberations process that causes jurors to become more 
influenced by a specific form of testimony, at least to the extent that they view the 
defendant as more psychopathic following discussion with their peers. Future research 
including expert testimony concerning psychopathy should consider this finding and 
include a deliberations activity when possible.  
 Diamond and Levi (1996) argue the deliberations process allows for jurors to 
correct misunderstandings held by other jurors and it is possible that participants in this 
study informed each other during the deliberations activity about misperceptions 
concerning the case. More likely, prosecution clinical opinion testimony appealed to the 
more subjective persuasive narrative of the case (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983), 
which jurors were able to further construct and elaborate on during group discussion, 
resulting in a significant effect of this type of testimony.  
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 These findings have interesting implications for future mock jury research. 
Consistent with previous research in this area (Diamond & Levi, 1996; Kerwin & 
Shaffer, 1994; Krauss & Lee, 2003) participants in this study demonstrated differences 
in decision outcomes following deliberations with their peers. However, these 
differences were only apparent for certain dependent variables (e.g., psychopathy 
ratings). Although approximately 14% of participants changed their ultimate verdict 
post-deliberations, there was no consistent direction, meaning participants were not 
significantly more likely to opt for a life or death sentence following discussion with 
their peers. Arguably, considering there was no significant difference in verdict 
following deliberations, the practical implications for including a deliberations activity 
are minimal. However, given some change in participants’ perceptions of the defendant 
(specifically in regards to level of psychopathy and psychopathic traits) future research 
should continue to include a deliberations activity whenever possible.  
Admittedly, although the methodology of this study afforded for a deliberations 
portion, only half of the study participants (which included only undergraduates) 
participated in deliberations. Furthermore, the deliberation sessions were not monitored 
by researchers. For this reason, there was no evaluation of the extent to which 
participants actively engaged in quality discussion regarding the relevant facts of the 
case. Presumably, some active discussion occurred given that some participant ratings 
changed. However, the content of the deliberations, including the extent to which 
participants discussed expert testimony, is unknown.  
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5.5 Implications 
 Consistent with previous literature, clinical opinion testimony had a significant 
effect on decision making. However, the expected effect was not found in terms of juror 
verdict or ratings of defendant dangerousness. Instead, prosecution clinical opinion 
testimony had a significant impact on mock juror ratings of the defendant’s psychopathic 
traits. In addition to the previously discussed questionable empirical basis of this 
testimony type, the considerable impact on perceptions of defendant psychopathy is 
troubling when considering the lack of an empirical relationship between psychopathic 
traits and institutional violence, a key element jurors are required to consider in certain 
jurisdictions. This study lends further support for the argument that this testimony is 
seemingly effective. However, this is not to suggest that this form of testimony is not 
questionable and may even be legally objectionable under the current Daubert standard.      
 Another important implication of these data concerns the importance of a 
deliberations portion of mock juror research. Participants in this study demonstrated 
interesting differences in decision making following a short deliberation session with 
their peers. Although including a deliberations session could complicate study design, it 
may be necessary to increase validity and more adequately answer the research question 
at hand. Future research should further examine how deliberations impacts decision 
making with community members.  
5.6 Limitations 
Community participants were recruited and completed study procedures via an 
online survey system. As discussed above, review of the mock jury literature (Bornstein, 
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1999) concluded no tangible differences between study outcomes when the method of 
trial presentation was manipulated. However, this review was done before the use of the 
internet for mock jury research became popular. As such, it is difficult to opine about the 
effect of this presentation modality. Furthermore, in order to increase the amount of 
variance attributable to the independent variables, the stimulus materials, including the 
description of the crime, judge’s instructions, and expert testimony, were kept fairly 
basic. Although experimental design and artificial stimulus presentation is common in 
mock jury research (see Bornstein, 1999) these factors decrease the ecological validity of 
these data.  
The current study design included counterbalancing of expert type of testimony 
such that clinical opinion testimony was always rebutted by actuarial testimony and 
actuarial testimony was always rebutted by clinical opinion testimony. It would be 
interesting to investigate participant responses when exposed to differing expert opinions 
from the same modality (e.g., clinical opinion rebutted by clinical opinion or actuarial 
rebutted by actuarial). Similar to the approach utilized by Krauss and Sales (2001), 
future research should explore the impact of expert opinion of the same modality on 
juror perceptions of defendant level of psychopathy and psychopathic traits.  
Another limitation of the current study design concerns the potentially 
confounding effect of presenting levels of psychopathy and future dangerousness 
simultaneously. Meaning, the expert’s opinion of a high likelihood for future 
dangerousness was always presented in conjunction with a finding that the defendant 
was a psychopath while the converse was true for a low likelihood of future 
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dangerousness and absence of psychopathy. Previous research (Cox, DeMatteo & Foster, 
2010) has found mock juror ratings of future dangerousness are more influenced by the 
expert’s future dangerousness prediction than the label of psychopathy. However, it’s 
possible that varying the level of dangerousness between conditions (e.g., expert opining 
that the defendant is a high likelihood for future dangerousness but not a psychopath) 
may allow for better isolation of the impact of future dangerousness testimony and 
psychopathy testimony separately.  
Finally, a major concern of all mock jury research is the lack of cognitive and 
emotional investment on the part of mock jurors (Diamond, 1997) and it is possible that 
the results of this study were a result of this limitation. It is impossible to accurately 
replicate the emotional and cognitive requirements that actual jurors must employ when 
sitting for a capital trial and contemplating rendering a death sentence. Presumably, real 
jurors would be more motivated to attend to the facts of the case and render the verdict 
they perceive as most appropriate given the evidence presented (Devine, Clayton, 
Dunford, Seying & Pryce, J., 2001; Diamond, 1997). 
5.7 Conclusions 
This study attempted to understand the relationship between expert testimony, 
participant information processing, and juror decision making in a capital murder trial. 
Given the high stakes of a capital case, a comprehensive understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying juror decision making is important. The current study adds to 
the existing literature in offering a better understanding of juror perceptions of 
psychopathic traits. Specifically, these data support the hypothesis that clinical opinion 
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testimony results in participants perceiving the defendant as more psychopathic, 
particularly in regards to affective and interpersonal psychopathy traits. Further, these 
results suggest participant preferred cognitive processing mode is an important factor to 
consider when measuring decision making. In conclusion, these data enhance our 
knowledge of the influence of mental health testimony as well as illuminate necessary 
areas for future research.  
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APPENDIX A 
Background Information 
 
 
 
Age: ______     Gender: Male _____ Female _____ (check 
one)  
 
 
What do you identify as your racial background? 
 
White or Caucasian______ Black or African-American_____ Hispanic ______ 
Other_____ 
 
 
What is the highest grade you completed in 
school?_________________________________ 
 
What do you identify as your religious affiliation (if any)?  
Protestant (non-Evangelical)_____ Protestant (Evangelical)_____ Catholic _____  
Jewish ____ 
Muslim____ Hindu____ Other____ 
 
What do you identify as your political affiliation (if any)?  
Democrat ______  Republican______  Independent______  Libertarian______  
Green Party______ Other______ 
 
 
If you served on a jury that found someone guilty of capital murder, do you think you could 
ever support giving someone a death sentenceK as punishment for the crime?  
---1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4---------------------5----------------------6-------------
--7DisagreeDisagreeDisagree              Neither Agree           AgreeAgreeAgreeStrongly             Moderately                 
a Little                nor Disagree            a Little                Moderately        Strongly 
 
 
If you were to serve on a jury and you found the defendant guilty of capital murder, would 
you automatically vote to impose the death penalty, no matter what the facts of the case 
were? 
---1----------------------2----------------------3----------------------4---------------------5----------------------6-------------
--7DisagreeDisagreeDisagree              Neither Agree           AgreeAgreeAgreeStrongly             Moderately                 
a Little                nor Disagree            a Little                Moderately        Strongly 
 
 114 
 
APPENDIX B 
REI-S 
Rate the following statements about your feelings, beliefs, and behaviors using the scale 
below. Work rapidly; first impressions are as good as any. 
 
1 = Definitely False 
2 = Mostly False  
3 = Undecided or Equally True and False 
4 = Mostly True 
5 = Definitely True 
 
I have a logical mind.    
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good 
enough for me. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I am not a very analytical thinker. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I prefer complex to simple problems. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I suspect my hunches are often inaccurate. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I trust my initial feelings about people. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
If I were to rely on my "gut feelings," I would often make mistakes. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.  
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I enjoy problems that require hard thinking. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I believe in trusting my hunches. 
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1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
1----------2----------3----------4----------5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
APPENDIX C 
Case Information  
 
On December 4, 2001Billie Coble was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder, 
four counts of kidnapping, and one count of attempted murder. Due to a legal error that 
occurred during the original sentencing phase, Mr. Coble has been granted a new 
sentencing trial. Please read the following facts concerning the case, background 
information, and testimony presented by both the prosecution and the defense.  
 
 
In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas  
Billie Coble, Appellant 
v.  
The State of Texas  
 
 
Mr. Coble married Karen Vince, his third wife, in July 1998. The marriage quickly fell 
apart and after one year Ms. Vince asked Mr. Coble to move out and filed for divorce. 
Mr. Coble attempted to talk Ms. Vince out of the decision and would randomly call her 
and show up at her work place.  
 
On the evening of October 3, 1999 Mr. Coble kidnapped Ms. Vince as an attempt to 
dissuade her from divorcing him. He hid in her car and attacked her, threatening her with 
a knife and driving her to a remote location in central Texas. After two hours, Ms. Vince 
was able to convince Mr. Coble that she had reconsidered and would remove her petition 
of divorce. At this point Mr. Coble drove Ms. Vince home and returned to his own 
residence.  
 
Ms. Vince immediately contacted the police. Mr. Coble was arrested, arraigned for 
kidnapping, and released on bail. Nine days after his release Mr. Coble went to Ms. 
Vince’s house when she was not home. He waited as Ms. Vince’s three daughters 
arrived home from school. Mr. Coble then handcuffed them, tied up their feet, and taped 
their mouths closed. Ms. Vince’s oldest daughter testified that he told them, “I should 
blow you away.” However, Mr. Coble left the girls tied up in Ms. Vince’s house and did 
not harm them further. He then left the residence and walked down the street to the 
house where Ms. Vince’s mother and father resided. He waited for each of them to 
return home and shot them as they walked through the front door. Both Bob and Bonnie 
Vince, Ms. Vince’s parents, died instantly.  
 
Mr. Coble then returned to Ms. Vince’s residence and waited in her garage for her to 
return home from work. When Ms. Vince arrived Mr. Coble kidnapped her at gunpoint 
and forced her into her car. As he began to drive outside of town Ms. Vince began to 
physically fight Mr. Coble in an attempt to free herself. During the altercation Ms. Vince 
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sustained a number of cuts and bruises, however, she did not have any serious injuries. 
As a result of the altercation Mr. Coble lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a 
telephone pole. Mr. Coble sustained severe injuries as a result of this crash and police 
were summoned to the scene.  
 
Mr. Coble was arrested and charged with two counts of first degree murder, four counts 
of aggravated kidnapping (one count for Ms. Vince and each of her daughters), and one 
count of attempted murder. He was found guilty of each of these crimes.  
 
Background information  
Mr. Coble was the third of three children born to a sickly, depressed mother and raised 
by an alcoholic step-father. By all indication, Mr. Coble was neglected and possibly 
abused as a young child. When he was four years-old his mother was admitted into a 
long-term psychiatric hospital and Mr. Coble was sent to a State Home for Children. He 
remained in the Children’s home for 13 years. At the age of 15 he was evaluated by a 
psychiatrist who determined he was paranoid, distant and impulsive.  
 
At the age of 18 Mr. Coble enlisted in the United States Marine Corps. He served in the 
Marine Corps for four years, one of those years were spent in active combat in Operation 
Desert Storm. Mr. Coble’s sister was interviewed and stated that he has not “been the 
same” since returning from active duty. He was honorably discharged at the age of 22.  
 
Mr. Coble married his first wife at the age of 23. The marriage lasted for two years and 
the couple parted amicably. He was remarried approximately one year later. This 
marriage lasted approximately eight months and the couple did not part on friendly 
terms. Mr. Coble’s second wife told police that he became physically violent towards her 
multiple times and his abuse is what led to their separation. In addition, she claimed that 
Mr. Coble sexually assaulted her 18 year-old sister on two separate occasions. Both 
women declined to press charges at the time.  
 
Since being incarcerated for his crimes Mr. Coble has received no disciplinary 
infractions. One guard described Mr. Coble as the “model inmate” who was always even 
tempered and had the ability to talk sense into other, more violent, inmates. Mr. Coble 
attributes his transformation to finding religion and dedicating his life to Christianity. 
Since being incarcerated he has organized a series of workshops for other inmates to 
learn English, led daily prayer and Bible study groups, and held a leadership job in the 
prison’s kitchen.  
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APPENDIX D 
Sentencing Instructions-Rational 
 
 The defendant was found guilty of two counts of 1
st
 degree murder 
approximately 20 years ago. Due to complications with the legal process, his original 
sentence was appealed and it is now your responsibility to determine his sentence. 
 
When determining this sentence you must consider two things:  
1. Will the defendant constitute a continuing threat to society? That is, what is the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit violent criminal acts in the future?  
2. Taking into account the defendant’s background, character, and the 
circumstances of the crime, is there sufficient justification for the crime that 
would warrant a sentence of life in prison rather than death?  
 
In order for a death penalty to be imposed the answer to the first question must 
be “yes” and the answer to the second question must be “no.” In all other cases, a 
sentence of life in prison must be imposed.  
 
When determining the sentence, please logically consider all of the evidence 
presented. Try to be as rational and analytical as possible.  
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APPENDIX E 
Sentencing Instructions-Experiential  
 
The defendant was found guilty of two counts of 1
st
 degree murder 
approximately 20 years ago. Due to complications with the legal process, his original 
sentence was appealed and it is now your responsibility to determine his sentence.  
 
When determining this sentence you must consider two things:  
1. Will the defendant constitute a continuing threat to society? That is, what is the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit violent criminal acts in the future?  
2. Taking into account the defendant’s background, character, and the 
circumstances of the crime, is there sufficient justification for the crime that 
would warrant a sentence of life in prison rather than death?  
 
In order for a death penalty to be imposed the answer to the first question must 
be “yes” and the answer to the second question must be “no.” In all other cases, a 
sentence of life in prison must be imposed.  
 
When determining the sentence, please go with your gut feeling. It’s important 
that you consider your intuitive response.  
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APPENDIX F  
Prosecution Expert Testimony: Actuarial & High Psychopathy/Risk 
 
Below is testimony presented by an expert witness for the prosecution, Dr. Patrick 
Cooney.  
 
Q: Could you please state your name for the record, as well as your title and experience 
in the field of forensic psychology?  
 
A: My name is Dr. Patrick Cooney. I have a degree in medicine from the University of 
Nebraska and completed a residency in psychiatry at Syracuse University College of 
Medicine and a fellowship in psychiatry at the same institution. I am board certified in 
Forensic Psychiatry and General Psychiatry. Finally, I have been conducting forensic 
evaluations for approximately 20 years and have conducted over 100 evaluations.  
 
Q: And you conducted a forensic evaluation on this defendant, Billie Coble?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: How much time did you spend with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Approximately two to three hours.  
 
Q: And what did you do during that time?  
 
A: I conducted an interview with the defendant as well as administered a number of 
psychological assessments.  
 
Q: Psychological assessments? What kind of psychological assessments?  
 
A: One of these measures was the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, which we call the 
VRAG. The VRAG uses specific factors to scientifically predict the likelihood that an 
individual will commit a violent act in the future. In addition, I administered the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, or PCL-R, which is an instrument designed to 
determine if an individual is a psychopath.  
 
Q: Did you complete a report for the court as a result of that evaluation?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: Could you tell the court what is in that report?  
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A:  I learned a number of things about the defendant. First, the PCL-R gave us insight 
into how psychopathic the defendant is.  
 
Q: What is a “psychopath?”  
 
A: A psychopath is someone who disregards the rights of others, has an inability to 
empathize, demonstrates superficial emotions, and grandiosity. Psychopaths often 
engage in impulsive behaviors, are willing to lie and con others for their own gain and 
may display aggressive behavior.  
 
Q: I see. And you used the PCL-R to measure whether Mr. Coble is a psychopath?  
 
A: Yes. The PCL-R is a psychological instrument that was developed and tested on 
many people. Research has demonstrated that it is very good at identifying what we in 
the psychology world consider to be “psychopathy.” In order to score the instrument I 
conducted an interview with the defendant and reviewed his prison records.  
 
Q: I see, and why do you evaluate someone for psychopathic personality?  
 
A: Psychopathy can indicate whether an individual will reoffend.  
 
Q: And what did the PCL-R tell you about Mr. Coble?  
 
A: From this evaluation and based on his scores on the PCL-R I determined that the 
defendant meets criteria for psychopathy.  
 
Q: So you determined that Mr. Coble is a “psychopath?” 
 
A: Correct. That is what the data indicate.  
 
Q: Thank you, Doctor. You also stated that you administered another psychological 
instrument, could you tell us about that?  
 
A: Yes. I also administered the VRAG. This instrument was designed to predict that 
likelihood that an individual would commit future violent acts. The prediction is based 
on a number of factors that have been scientifically proven to predict violent behavior 
including past violent behavior, age, alcohol and drug use, and any psychological 
disorders. It has also been tested on a large group of people and shown to be fairly 
accurate.  
 
Q: And what did this VRAG tell you about Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Based on the data, it is my opinion that there is a high likelihood that Mr. Coble 
would commit another violent act in the future.  
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Q: You believe that Mr. Coble is likely to be a future danger to society?  
 
A: Correct.  
 
Q: Thank you, no further questions.  
 
Defense Expert Testimony: Clinical & Low Psychopathy/Risk 
 
 
Below is testimony presented by an expert witness for the defense, Dr. Dylan Wesley  
 
Q: Could you please state your name for the record, as well as your title and experience 
in the field of forensic psychology?  
 
A: My name is Dr. Dylan Wesley. I have a degree in medicine from University of 
Georgia and completed a residency in psychiatry at the University of Virginia, College 
of Medicine and a fellowship in psychiatry at the University of Arizona. I am board 
certified in both General and Forensic Psychiatry. I have conducted approximately 120 
evaluations for the courts over the past 18 years.  
 
Q: And you conducted a forensic evaluation on this defendant, Billie Coble?   
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: How much time did you spend with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Approximately two to three hours.  
 
Q: And what did you do during that time?  
 
A: I interviewed the defendant. I do kind of a standard interview using methods that I 
have established over my (18) years of conducting these evaluations. During the 
interview I look for a set of factors. Specifically, I look for a history of violence, the 
defendant’s attitude towards violence, and personality factors associated with 
psychopathic personality disorder.    
 
Q: Did you complete a report for the court as a result of that interview?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: Could you tell the court what is in that report?   
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A: I learned a number of things about the defendant. First, I got insight into how much of 
a psychopath the defendant is.  
 
Q: What is a “psychopath?”  
 
A: A psychopath is someone who disregards the rights of others, has an inability to 
empathize, demonstrates superficial emotions, and grandiosity. Psychopaths often 
engage in impulsive behaviors, are willing to lie and con others for their own gain and 
may display aggressive behavior.  
 
Q: I see, and why do you evaluate someone for psychopathic personality?  
 
A: Psychopathy, as well as many of the other risk factors I mentioned earlier like a 
history of violence and the defendant’s attitude towards violence, can indicate whether 
an individual will reoffend.  
 
Q: Interesting. And what did you determine from your interview with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: I determined that Mr. Coble likely committed these crimes under a great deal of stress 
and frustration. Although I did not know Mr. Coble at the time, it is my hypothesis that 
these crimes were the acts of a desperate man who was immediately remorseful for his 
crime. Currently, he seems to function at a much more mature emotional level, meaning 
he is able to empathize with others, considers the consequences of his actions, and shows 
remorse for his previous crimes. 
 
Q: So you determined that Mr. Coble is not a psychopath?  
 
A: Correct. In my opinion, Mr. Coble is not a psychopath.  
 
Q: Did you determine if Mr. Coble is a continuing threat to society?  
 
A: I can state that it is my opinion that there is a low likelihood that Mr. Coble will 
commit another violent crime in the future.  
 
Q: And just to clarify, what do you base this opinion on?  
 
A: I base this opinion on the defendant’s good behavior while incarcerated, his age… 
 
Q: Excuse me, his age?  
 
A: Yes. Statistically, criminal behavior decreases with age.  
 
Q: I understand, please, continue.  
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A: I base this opinion on Mr. Coble’s good behavior while incarcerated, his age, his 
failing health, and the remorse he demonstrated towards his victim and about his crime.  
 
Q: Thank you, no further questions.  
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APPENDIX G  
Prosecution Expert Testimony: Clinical & High Psychopathy/Risk 
 
Below is testimony presented by an expert witness for the prosecution, Dr. Patrick 
Cooney.  
 
Q: Could you please state your name for the record, as well as your title and experience 
in the field of forensic psychology?  
 
A: My name is Dr. Patrick Cooney. I have a degree in medicine from the University of 
Nebraska and completed a residency in psychiatry at Syracuse University College of 
Medicine and a fellowship in psychiatry at the same institution. I am board certified in 
Forensic Psychiatry and General Psychiatry. Finally, I have been conducting forensic 
evaluations for approximately 20 years and have conducted over 100 evaluations.  
 
Q: And you conducted a forensic evaluation on this defendant, Billie Coble?   
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: How much time did you spend with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Approximately two to three hours.  
 
Q: And what did you do during that time?  
 
A: I interviewed the defendant. I do kind of a standard interview using methods that I 
have established over my 20years of conducting these evaluations. During the interview 
I look for a set of factors. Specifically, I look for a history of violence, the defendant’s 
attitude towards violence, and personality factors associated with psychopathic 
personality disorder.    
 
Q: Did you complete a report for the court as a result of that interview?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: Could you tell the court what is in that report?   
 
A: I learned a number of things about the defendant. First, I got insight into how much of 
a psychopath the defendant is.  
 
Q: What is a “psychopath?”  
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A: A psychopath is someone who disregards the rights of others, has an inability to 
empathize, demonstrates superficial emotions, and grandiosity. Psychopaths often 
engage in impulsive behaviors, are willing to lie and con others for their own gain and 
may display aggressive behavior.  
 
Q: I see, and why do you evaluate someone for psychopathic personality?  
 
A: Psychopathy, as well as many of the other risk factors I mentioned earlier like a 
history of violence and the defendant’s attitude towards violence, can indicate whether 
an individual will reoffend.  
 
Q: And what did you determine from your interview with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: I determined that Mr. Coble has a cavalier attitude towards his crime. He did not 
appear to be remorseful for his actions nor did he demonstrate empathy towards his 
victim. In addition, he has a history of violence towards women. 
 
Q: So you determined that Mr. Coble is a psychopath?  
 
A: Correct. In my opinion, Mr. Coble is a psychopath.  
 
Q: Did you determine if Mr. Coble is a continuing threat to society?  
 
A: I can state that it is my opinion that there is a high likelihood that Mr. Coble will 
commit another violent crime in the future.  
 
Q: And just to clarify, what do you base this opinion on?  
 
A: I base this belief on the defendant’s history of violence... he was accused by a 
previous wife of being physically violent towards her… the heinousness of the current 
crime, and his personality disorder which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for him to 
function within the constraints of societal norms.   
 
Q: Thank you, no further questions. 
 
Defense Expert Testimony: Actuarial & Low Psychopathy/Risk 
 
Below is testimony presented by an expert witness for the defense, Mr. Dylan Wesley.  
 
Q: Could you please state your name for the record, as well as your title and experience 
in the field of forensic psychology?  
 
A: My name is Dr. Dylan Wesley. I have a degree in medicine from University of 
Georgia and completed a residency in psychiatry at the University of Virginia, College 
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of Medicine, and a fellowship in psychiatry at the University of Arizona. I am board 
certified in both General and Forensic Psychiatry. I have conducted approximately 120 
evaluations for the courts over the past 18 years.  
 
Q: And you conducted a forensic evaluation on this defendant, Billie Coble?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: How much time did you spend with Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Approximately two to three hours.  
 
Q: And what did you do during that time?  
 
A: I conducted an interview with the defendant as well as administered a number of 
psychological assessments.  
 
Q: Psychological assessments? What kind of psychological assessments?  
 
A: One of these measures was the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, which we call the 
VRAG. The VRAG uses specific factors to scientifically predict the likelihood that an 
individual will commit a violent act in the future. In addition, I administered the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, or PCL-R, which is an instrument designed to 
determine if an individual is a psychopath.  
 
Q: Did you complete a report for the court as a result of that evaluation?  
 
A: Yes.  
 
Q: Could you tell the court what is in that report?  
 
A:  I learned a number of things about the defendant. First, the PCL-R gave us insight 
into how psychopathic the defendant is.  
 
Q: What is a “psychopath?”  
 
A: A psychopath is someone who disregards the rights of others, has an inability to 
empathize, demonstrates superficial emotions, and grandiosity. Psychopaths often 
engage in impulsive behaviors, are willing to lie and con others for their own gain and 
may display aggressive behavior.  
 
Q: I see. And you used the PCL-R to measure whether Mr. Coble is a psychopath?  
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A: Yes. The PCL-R is a psychological instrument that was developed and tested on 
many people. Research has demonstrated that it is very good at identifying what we in 
the psychology world consider to be “psychopathy.” In order to score the instrument I 
conducted an interview with the defendant and reviewed his prison records.  
 
Q: I see, and why do you evaluate someone for psychopathic personality?  
 
A: Psychopathy can be indicative of whether an individual will reoffend.  
 
Q: And what did the PCL-R tell you about Mr. Coble?  
 
A: From this evaluation and based on his scores on the PCL-R I determined that the 
defendant does not meet criteria for psychopathy.  
 
Q: So you determined that Mr. Coble is not a “psychopath?” 
 
A: Correct. That is what the data indicate.  
 
Q: Thank you, Doctor. You also stated that you administered another psychological 
instrument, could you tell us about that?  
 
A: Yes. I also administered the VRAG. This instrument was designed to predict that 
likelihood that an individual would commit future violent acts. The prediction is based 
on a number of factors that have been scientifically proven to predict violent behavior 
including past violent behavior, age, alcohol and drug use, and any psychological 
disorders. It has also been tested on a large group of people and shown to be fairly 
accurate.  
Q: And what did this VRAG tell you about Mr. Coble?  
 
A: Based on the data, it is my opinion that there is a low likelihood that Mr. Coble would 
commit another violent act in the future.  
 
Q: You believe that Mr. Coble is not likely to be a future danger to society?  
 
A: Correct.  
 
Q: Thank you, no further questions.  
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APPENDIX H 
Case Evaluation  
 
Considering the evidence present at this time, which sentence would you be more likely 
to recommend?  
A. A sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole 
B. A sentence of death  
 
How confident are you in making this decision?  
0--------10-------20-------30-------40-------50-------60-------70-------80------90-------100 
Not very confident    Somewhat confident   Very Confident  
 
Considering the evidence present at this time, what is the likelihood that the defendant 
will commit another violent crime (i.e. against a corrections officer or another inmate) if 
given a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole?  
0--------10-------20-------30-------40-------50-------60-------70-------80------90-------100 
No likelihood         Definitely will 
occur  
 
Considering the evidence present at this time, what is the likelihood that the defendant 
will commit another murder (i.e. against a corrections officer or another inmate) if given 
a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole?  
0--------10-------20-------30-------40-------50-------60-------70-------80------90-------100 
No likelihood         Definitely will 
occur  
 
Considering the evidence present at this time, how psychopathic would you rate this 
individual (i.e. how much of a “psychopath” is he)?  
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0--------10-------20-------30-------40-------50-------60-------70-------80------90-------100 
Not at all psychopathic        Definitely a 
psychopath 
 
How confident are you in your rating of the defendant’s level of psychopathy?  
0--------10-------20-------30-------40-------50-------60-------70-------80------90-------100 
Not at all confident   Somewhat confident   Very confident  
 
 
 
 
Given the facts of this case, please rate whether you would expect someone like this 
person to have the following personality traits and characteristics. (For these ratings, 
please circle 0, 1, or 2) 
 
 
 
Not at                     Very 
  All    Somewhat   Much 
0-----------1----------2     1) Superficially charming or glib 
0-----------1----------2     2) Inflated sense of self-worth/Egotistical 
0-----------1----------2     3) Need for stimulation/easily bored 
0-----------1----------2     4) Pathological lying  
0-----------1----------2     5) Conning/manipulative 
0-----------1----------2     6) Lack of remorse or guilt for past bad acts 
0-----------1----------2     7) Shallow emotions (for example, cold or generally 
unemotional) 
0-----------1----------2     8) Callous/Lack of empathy for other people 
0-----------1----------2     9) Parasitic lifestyle (such as, living off others even though 
capable of work) 
0-----------1----------2     10) Poor behavioral controls (for example, prone to fighting and 
aggressive acts) 
0-----------1----------2     11) Promiscuous sexual behavior 
0-----------1----------2     12) Early childhood behavior problems (such as serious trouble in 
elementary school) 
0-----------1----------2     13) Lack of realistic long-term life goals (for example, no plans or 
unrealistic plans) 
0-----------1----------2     14) Impulsive (for example, does things on the “spur of the 
moment”) 
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0-----------1----------2     15) Irresponsible behavior (such as owes money, poor work 
history, drunk driving) 
0-----------1----------2     16) Fails to accept responsibility for his bad actions 
0-----------1----------2     17) Many short-term marital relationships 
0-----------1----------2     18) History of juvenile delinquency (that is, arrests before age 18) 
0-----------1----------2     19) Having a history of failure on parole or conditional release 
0-----------1----------2     20) Criminal versatility (that is, a history of many types of criminal 
behavior) 
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APPENDIX I 
Evidence Rating Form  
For the following items, please rate on a scale from 1-7 how influential each piece of 
evidence was in helping you make your final decision.  
-------1-------------------2--------------------3--------------------4-------------------5-------------------6-------------------7----- 
Not very influential                  Very influential 
for my decision          for my decision 
 
______      The abuse Mr. Coble sustained during childhood 
______      Mr. Coble’s possible history of sexually assaulting women 
______      Mr. Coble’s claim that he became a born-again Christian while incarcerated 
______      The evidence that Mr. Coble kidnapped his ex-wife  
______      Mr. Coble’s current age 
______      The evidence that Mr. Coble was not provoked by any of his victims  
______      The heinousness of the murders 
______      Expert testimony presented by the prosecution concerning Mr. Coble’s risk of
       future dangerousness  
______      Expert testimony presented by the defense concerning Mr. Coble’s risk of
       future dangerousness  
______      The number of people Mr. Coble killed  
______      Testimony concerning Mr. Coble’s good works while incarcerated (i.e.  
       helping others gain an education, organizing clubs, etc.)  
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APPENDIX J 
Comprehension Questionnaire  
 
Coble was on trial for committing which of the following crimes?   
a) Child endangerment   
b) Driving while Intoxicated   
c) Murder   
d) Forgery  
Who was Coble accused of killing? 
a) His boss     
b) His father-in-law   
c) His mother   
d) Three strangers  
The most severe sentence that Coble was facing was…?  
a) Death Penalty    
b) Probation    
c) Five years in county jail   
d) Deportation 
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APPENDIX K 
Manipulation Check  
 
Instructions from the judge encouraged you to think about the evidence: 
a) In a rational, logical and thoughtful manner 
b) Using your gut feelings and intuition  
The expert witness for the prosecution based his testimony on:  
a) What the attorneys told him to say  
b) What the defendant told him to say  
c) Psychological tests like the VRAG or PCL-R  
d) His clinical experience  
According to the expert witness for the prosecution, the defendant:  
a) Is a psychopath 
b) Is not a psychopath 
c) Is depressed 
d) Is not depressed  
According to the expert witness for the prosecution, if the defendant is given a sentence 
of life in prison:  
a) He will need medical treatment for the rest of his life  
b) His victims will require psychotherapy  
c) He will continue to be a risk to society  
d) He will no longer be a risk to society  
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APPENDIX L 
 
Manipulation Check – Post-procedures Experientiality 
 
1. I can usually sense when someone is being fake  
2. A lot of times I just know what to do in my gut  
3. My sense of intuition is better than most of my friends’  
4. Relying on my first instinct has led me to make mistakes in the past (R) 
1. When I’m making an important decision, it’s best to trust my instincts  
2. Situations that require me to trust my hunches make me uncomfortable (R) 
3. I don’t think people should rely only on their gut feelings (R)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
